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INTRODUCTION
Federal firearms regulation has provided the context in which courts have
developed legal principles governing a much wider domain. For example,
Printz v. United States,' a seminal contemporary decision addressing limits
on federal commandeering of state officials, arose from federally mandated
background checks of firearms purchases. Abramski v. United States,2 in
which the Court announces a rule under which administrative interpretations
of statutes criminalizing conduct are not entitled to deference, involves
criminalization of false statements made in connection with firearms
purchases. The contemporary limitation of Commerce Clause power
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
2 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014).
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initiated by the decision in United States v. Lopez3 also, of course, involves
regulation of firearms possession, although, somewhat ironically, in another
case eighteen years earlier also involving firearms possession, the Supreme
Court affirmed a holding that "the interstate commerce nexus requirement
of [a federal] possession offense was satisfied" merely "by proof that the
firearm . . . had previously traveled in interstate commerce."' Lastly, the
foundational determination in United States v. Biswell,' validating a
warrantless regulatory inspection, involves a firearms dealer. This Article
examines another aspect of the federal regulation of firearms possession that
presents fundamental issues with wide-ranging implications.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has
expressed an opinion on the scope of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as
amended,6 presenting core federalism issues and what appears to be a mirror
image of the statutory interpretation issue in King v. Burwell,' where the
Court struggles with extending the term "established by the State" to entities
that are most certainly not "established" by a state.
Subject to certain exceptions, the Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibits
firearms possession within 1000 feet of an elementary or secondary school
by a person who is not licensed to do so by the state. Specifically, the
language references one who "is licensed to do so by the State in which the
school zone is located . . . . "9 The ATF takes the anomalous position that
licensure through reciprocity is not authorized by the federal statute.o This
position gives rise to a number of issues, which this Article develops as
follows:
The ATF's interpretation and the articulated rationale are detailed in Part
I. As will be seen, the ATF's discussion is conclusory. The ATF merely
asserts that the term "licensed by," when followed by reference to a
governmental entity, excludes licensure through reciprocity.
The manner in which states opt to authorize public firearms possession
varies widely. Part II briefly sketches some of the variation, which puts in
context the interpretive issue raised by the GFSZA.
Parts III through V then illustrate that the ATF's interpretation, which the
ATF asserts is commanded by a literal interpretation of the statute, is not in
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 566 (1977).
5 406 U.S. 311, 315-17 (1972).
6 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2015).
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921(a)(25), 922(q)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
o See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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fact so compelled. Part III collects assorted authority where the term
"licensed by" includes licensure through reciprocity or other automatic
authorization without the licensing entity taking any licensee-specific
action. Part TV then contrasts the outcome in King v. Burwell" to the position
being taken by the ATF, concluding that finding the ATF's interpretation is
not required by the statute is easier than supporting the interpretive outcome
reached in Burwell. Part V then briefly discusses a part of the statute not
prominently addressed by the ATF's interpretation, concluding that other
language also does not mandate the interpretive outcome the ATF urges, at
least as to reciprocity granted to out-of-state holders of otherwise
satisfactory actual (physical) permits.
Understanding that the statutory language does not unambiguously
command the interpretation the ATF proffers, Parts VI through VIII then
turn to interpreting the relevant language in light of canons of construction
applicable to facially ambiguous statutory language.
This particular statute, unlike many, expressly codifies its purposes. Part
VI demonstrates that those purposes do not necessitate the interpretation the
ATF pronounces.
Parts VII and VIII then survey the federalism implications of the ATF's
interpretation. As noted in Part VII, in brief, the ATF's interpretation yields
a federal framework under which either states are compelled to adopt a
licensing scheme or persons may not possess firearms within 1000 feet of a
school. The first option alone cannot be dictated by the federal government.
That would be improper commandeering. So, the interpretation yields an
unconstitutional statute, unless the federal government would have the
authority to ban firearms possession in school zones. Although this subject
receives only cursory analysis by courts, the scope of such a ban would
present substantial constitutional issues.
Part VIII then examines ordinary principles of federalism that require a
clear mandate to alter substantially the balance between federal and state
authority. As illustrated in Part VIII, this principle has been applied in the
particular context of restrictively interpreting federal statutes that would
burden a state's choices in allocating its authority among subdivisions or to
third parties. That is, it is not the case that this interpretive principle has been
applied only in circumstances altering the balance between state and federal
authority in contexts well removed from the one at hand. Nixon v. Missouri
Municipal Leaguel2 is illustrative. In Nixon, the Court holds a federal statute
" 135 S. Ct. 2480.
12 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
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preempting state laws prohibiting the provision of services by "any entity"
does not operate to preempt state laws restricting services by municipalities,
"so as to affect the power of states and localities to restrict their own (or their
political inferiors') delivery of such services." 3
This ATF interpretation would do so, as to a core matter - ordinary
crime - of the type regulated by states. For these reasons, ATF's
interpretation is unsound.
I. THE ATF's INTERPRETATION
The Gun-Free School Zones. Act, as amended (the "GFSZA"),
criminalizes, with assorted significant exceptions, the possession of a
firearm in a school zone:14
(2)(A) It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects
interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.15
A "school zone" consists of the area within 1000 feet of an elementary or
secondary school.'" There are a number of exceptions to the prohibition. One
1 Id. at 128-29.
14 The Act is examined in, inter alia, Gerald F. Dusing, Arming School Employees: Considering Its
Legal Feasibility and Potential for Liability, in EMERGING TRENDS IN EDUCATION LAW: LEADING
LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON K-12 CAMPUSES 25 (2013); David B.
Kopel, Pretend "Gun-Free" School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515 (2009) (also
discussing corresponding state provisions); Grant Arnold, Note and Comment, Arming the Good Guys:
School Zones and the Second Amendment, 2015 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 481, 495-98 (2015); Amy Hetzner,
Comment, Where Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an Individual Right to Bear Arms, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 359 (2011).
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). The statute was amended
in 1996 to add an interstate commerce nexus, following the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to -371 (1996). Courts have held this change adequately addressed
the constitutional infirmity identified in Lopez. E.g., United States v. Nieves-Castano, 480 F.3d 597, 602
(1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Danks,
221 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hall, No. CRIM.05-00332-CG, 2006 WL 752986,
at *1 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 22, 2006); see generally Jason Mazzone & Carl Emery Woock, Federalism as
Docket Control, 94 N.C. L. REv. 7, 82 (2015); but see United States v. Hoffmeyer, No. 00-CR-91-C,
2001 WL 34372871, at *21 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 25, 2001) (Magistrate's report recommending Danks not be
followed).
16 The definitions provide in pertinent part:
(25) The term "school zone" means -
(A) in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or
2017] 143
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is that states are permitted to authorize possession in a school zone by
license; the possession is not criminalized
if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so
by the State in which the school zone is located or a political
subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or political
subdivision requires that, before an individual obtains such
a license, the law enforcement authorities of the State or
political subdivision verify that the individual is qualified
17under law to receive the license ....
The ATF has taken the position that a nonresident who is licensed by a
state through reciprocity alone, giving recognition to a permit issued by
another state, is not "licensed to do so by the State in which the school zone
is located" - licensure by that state through reciprocity is not, in their view,
licensure by a state. The ATF's analysis, set forth informally in a letter in
response to a citizen inquiry, implements their literal reading of the statute.
The analysis, insofar as one is articulated, is:
The law clearly provides that in order to qualify as an
exception to the general prohibition of the GFSZA, the
license must be issued by the State in which the school zone
is located or a political subdivision of that State. A
concealed weapons license or permit from any other State
would not satisfy the criteria set forth in the law.'"
(B) within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or
private school.
(26) The term "school" means a school which provides elementary or secondary
education, as determined under State law.
18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). To illustrate, Missouri law provides the
definition of "elementary school" as "a public school giving instruction in a grade or grades not higher
than the eighth grade." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.011 (Westlaw through end of the 2016 Regular Session
and Veto Session of the 98th General Assembly).
The relationship between proof of proximity and knowledge is addressed infra note 204.
" 18 U.S.C.A § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
18 A more comprehensive selection from the language is as follows:
First, you ask if an Oklahoma license holder possessing a loaded handgun
would be in violation of the GFSZA while traveling on public streets and highways
which are known to the individual to be within 1,000 feet of the grounds of any
school as defined by Title 18 United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 921(a)(26),
while in another State that recognizes Oklahoma's license by statute or legal
agreement.
144 [Vol. XXXIL 139
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This Article examines the validity of that interpretation.
There is delegated authority to adopt rules implementing the chapter
containing this federal statute, although it is somewhat curiously
circumscribed.' 9 Assorted authority defers to ATF interpretations in a
The law provides certain exceptions to the general ban on possession of
firearms in school zones. One exception is where the individual possessing the
firearm "is licensed to do so by the State in which the school zone is located or a
political subdivision of the State" (Titlel8 [sic] U.S.C. Section 922(q)(2)(B)(ii)).
A license qualifies as an exception only if the law of the State or political
subdivision requires law enforcement authorities to verify that the individual is
qualified under law to receive the license.
The law clearly provides that in order to qualify as an exception to the general
prohibition of the GFSZA, the license must be issued by the State in which the
school zone is located or a political subdivision of that State. A concealed weapons
license or permit from any other State would not satisfy the criteria set forth in the
law.
Letter from Ashan Benedict, Chief, Intergovernmental Affairs Division, Public and Governmental
Affairs, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, to Tim Gillespie, at 1 (July 25, 2013) (on
file with author). One can find on the internet reproductions of an unauthenticated document, partially
redacted, that purports to be an April 17, 2002, letter from the ATF reaching a similar conclusion. See
http://www.handgunlaw.us/documents/batf schoolzone.pdf (visited Mar. 6, 2017).
Some Federal agencies make informal letter advice conveniently available to the public, e.g., the
Securities and Exchange Commission, for which releases since January 15, 2002 (or earlier for some
divisions) are posted on the internet, https://www.sec.gov/interps/noaction.shtml, and for which that
correspondence going back to 1970 is available in Westlaw (Westlaw, SEC No-Action Letters database,
stating coverage begins with 1970). The ATF, however, is not one of them. See Ronald Turk, Federal
Firearms Regulation: Options to Reduce or Modify Firearms Regulations, White Paper (Not for public
distribution), at 6 (Jan. 20, 2017) (on file with Author) ("ATF lacks a consistent internal database to
maintain and readily access private letters and ruling. The public also has no direct access to public
rulings in a manageable format. The inability to access these rulings can create inconsistent agency
interpretations of agency guidance.") This letter to Tim Gillespie was forwarded to the author by letter
of April 27, 2016, thirteen months after it was requested by the author in a Freedom of Information Act
request. See Letter from Stephanie M. Boucher, Chief, Disclosure Division, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives to Royce de R. Barondes, at 1 (Apr. 27, 2016) (referencing March 2, 2015,
FOIA request; forwarding Letter from Ashan Benedict to Tim Gillespie, supra) (on file with author).
" The general provision is as follows (there being a separate restriction on issuance of regulations
concerning purchase of black powder):
The Attorney General may prescribe only such rules and regulations as are
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter, [18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931,]
including
(1) regulations providing that a person licensed under this chapter, when dealing
with another person so licensed, shall provide such other licensed person a
certified copy of this license;
(2) regulations providing for the issuance, at a reasonable cost, to a person licensed
under this chapter, of certified copies of his license for use as provided under
regulations issued under paragraph (1) of this subsection; and
(3) regulations providing for effective receipt and secure storage of firearms
relinquished by or seized from persons described in subsection (d)(8) or (g)(8) of
section 922.
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variety of contexts.20 For example, in United States v. Douglas,2 1 the court
defers to an ATF interpretation in addressing whether a dealer's sales were
lawful under 18 U.S.C. § 925(b), which allows a dealer who is indicted for
a crime that would bar his acting as a dealer, a year to wind-down lawfully
his business.22
As a preliminary matter, in determining whether the ATF's interpretation
of the GFSZA is correct, a contemporary court would provide no deference
to the ATF's interpretation of this language. This ATF statement is not an
No such rule or regulation prescribed after the date of the enactment of the
Firearms Owners' Protection Act may require that records required to be
maintained under this chapter or any portion of the contents of such records, be
recorded at or transferred to a facility owned, managed, or controlled by the United
States or any State or any political subdivision thereof, nor that any system of
registration of firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transactions or dispositions
be established. Nothing in this section expands or restricts the Secretary's
authority to inquire into the disposition of any firearm in the course of a criminal
investigation.
18 U.S.C.A. § 926(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
National Rifle Assn v. Brady, 914 F.2d 475, 478 (4th Cir. 1990), notes that the delegated authority
was limited by the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 106, 100 Stat. 449, 459-60
(1986), prior to which "the Gun Control Act's enabling provision stated that '[tihe Secretary may
prescribe such rules and regulations as he deems reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this
chapter.' "
"Since its inception, the Gun Control Act of 1968 ('GCA') was administered and enforced by the
Secretary of the Treasury ('the Secretary'), who delegated these duties to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms ('ATF' or 'BATF')." STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK § 2:3 (Westlaw,
database updated Oct. 2015). Authority of the Secretary of the Treasury was delegated to the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms under, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44, in Treasury Department Order
221, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms: Establishment, Organization, and Functions, 37 Fed.
Reg. 11,696, 11,696-97 (June 10, 1972). The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § Ill l(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2135,
2274 (Nov. 25, 2002), currently codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 599A (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-
327), by which act the newly created Bureau was transferred the functions of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, and the related functions of the Secretary of the Treasury. Although one will
occasionally encounter the Bureau's name abbreviated as "BATFE," e.g., Amendment to the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations: International Import Certificate BIS-645P/ATF-4522/DSP-
53 and Administrative Changes, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,668, 22,669 (Apr. 17, 2012), the Bureau itself typically
adopts the acronym "ATF." See, e.g., Identification Markings Placed on Firearm Silencers and Firearm
Mufflers, 81 Fed. Reg. 26,764, 26,764 (May 4, 2016).
20 E.g., Springfield, Inc. v. Buckles, 292 F.3d 813, 817-19 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (following the ATF's
interpretation of what arms are "particularly suitable for" "sporting purposes," as required to allow their
importation under 18 U.S.C.A. § 925(d)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327), as amended by
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 11 12(f)(1)), 116 Stat. 2135, 2276 (Nov. 25,
2002); and stating the result is the same applying either Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
21 974 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh g (Oct. 14, 1992).
22 See id. at 1048-49. As the court notes, "[T]he irony in this case is that the BATF's interpretation
of the statute, as discussed below, supports rather than undermines Douglas's interpretation. Moreover,
it is unclear whether an agency's interpretation of a criminal statute is entitled to deference under
Chevron." Id. at 1047 n.1 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837).
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interpretation of an extant agency rule, potentially within the scope of Auer
v. Robbins.2 3 Nor is it part of a duly promulgated rule filling an explicit gap
left in the legislation for the agency, which could be binding "unless
procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute."24 Because the interpretation does not constitute the
filling of such a gap, it is not entitled to deference. The simplest reason is
that, as the Supreme Court has noted - in fact in construing a different
paragraph of the same section of Title 18 of the U.S. Code - administrative
interpretations of criminal statutes are not entitled to deference:
The critical point is that criminal laws are for courts, not for
the Government, to construe. We think ATF's old position
no more relevant than its current one - which is to say, not
relevant at all. Whether the Government interprets a
criminal statute too broadly (as it sometimes does) or too
narrowly (as the ATF used to in construing § 922(a)(6)), a
court has an obligation to correct its error.25
23 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (stating, as to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of a rule
promulgated by the Secretary, "[HI]is interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' ") (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)). The ongoing vitality of Auer is, in any case, somewhat uncertain. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson,
Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943, 945 (2017) ("The days of Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.[, 325 U.S. 410 (1945),] may be numbered. At least as it has come to be understood, Seminole Rock
deference - also commonly called Auer deference - commands courts to defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations. . . . [T]he U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has
questioned this deference.").
24 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) ("When Congress has 'explicitly left
a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation,' and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless
procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44)).
25 Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014). Abramski involves the purchase of a
firearm by a former police officer for his uncle, arranged to take advantage of law enforcement officer
discount pricing. Id. at 2264-65. The purchase required the nephew to identify himself as the "actual
transferee/buyer." Id. at 2264. Both parties could lawfully have purchased the firearm. Id. at 2275 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The court holds the nephew/initial buyer improperly identified himself as the actual
transferee/buyer, id at 2274 (majority opinion), notwithstanding that for approximately twenty-five
years, id. at 2280 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the ATF took the view that this action was not unlawful, the
ATF having changed its mind about twenty years before the Court's decision. Id. at 2274 (majority
opinion).
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In support of the first quoted sentence, the Court quotes United States v.
Apel 6 as follows, "[W]e have never held that the Government's reading of
a criminal statute is entitled to any deference."2 7
In addition, because the question involves interpretation of a criminal
statute, to patch together extracts from a more lengthy paragraph in the
plurality opinion in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., if "[a]fter
applying the ordinary rules of statutory construction", a court is "left with
an ambiguous statute," "[i]t is proper . . . to apply the rule of lenity and
resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor."28 There is thus a heavy
burden necessary to sustain the ATF's interpretation - one it appears ATF
is unable to carry.
II. VARIATION IN THE MANNER OF STATE LICENSURE
Placing in context the interpretive issue presented by the GFSZA requires
some reference to the diverse ways in which states authorize the public
possession of firearms generally, whether or not in proximity to elementary
or secondary schools. The mere possession of a firearm anywhere in the state
may require licensure through licensee-specific application.29 For example,
Illinois requires the possession of a Firearm Owner's Identification Card to
26 United States v. Apel, 134 S.Ct. 1144 (2014).
27 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2274 (quoting Apel, 134 S. Ct. at 1151) (alteration brackets in original).
One therefore need not enter the morass of whether the interpretation, though not the result of notice and
comment proceedings, were it not involving interpretation of a criminal statute, would be entitled to
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
or Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). See generally Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 235 (stating,
"A classification ruling in this situation may therefore at least seek a respect proportional to its 'power
to persuade,' " (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 237 ("Whether courts do
owe deference in a given case turns, for him, on whether the agency action (if reasonable) is
'authoritative.' The character of the authoritative derives, in tum, not from breadth of delegation or the
agency's procedure in implementing it, but is defined as the 'official' position of an agency and may
ultimately be a function of administrative persistence alone." (citations omitted)); id. at 234, 238-39
(requiring application of Skidmore deference, and stating, "In sum, classification rulings are best treated
like 'interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.' "); id.
at 230-31 (2001) ("That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons
for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was
afforded.").
28 504 U.S. 505, 517-18 (1992) (noting, inter alia, "The key to resolving the ambiguity lies in
recognizing that although it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal
applications that carry no additional requirement of willfulness. It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule
of lenity . . . .") (Souter, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and
O'Connor, J.).
29 See generally Mishaga v. Schmitz, 136 F. Supp. 3d 981, 997 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (identifying seven
states requiring acquisition of a permit or license to purchase or possess certain firearms).
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possess a firearm in the state,30 with limited exceptions, e.g., for nonresidents
who are at recognized shooting ranges 3 1 and nonresident hunters with valid
nonresident hunting licenses.32 Another exception in Illinois, the subject of
litigation discussed below,33 includes certain possession by "[n]onresidents
who are currently licensed or registered to possess a firearm in their resident
state." 34
Separate from requiring authorization to possess a firearm at all - in any
fashion - in a state, state law may regulate the extent to which a firearm
may be possessed in public areas generally (and, therefore, may regulate
possession in those public areas in the state regulated by the GFSZA).
State law may simply authorize the possession in public for those whose
firearms possession generally is lawful, without possessor-specific
authorization having been granted by the state. 35 This authorization may be
for both concealed and open (non-concealed) possession,3 6 or it may be
limited to possession in a particular manner, e.g., openly carried.
3o 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(a) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-938 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
' Id. § 2(b)(7).
32 Id. § 2(b)(5).
33 See infra notes 59-81 and accompanying text.
3 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(bX10).
" See, e.g., State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610, 610-11 (1903) ("Under the general laws, therefore, a
person not a member of a school may carry a dangerous or deadly weapon, openly or concealed, unless
he does it with the intent or avowed purpose of injuring another; and a person who is a member of a
school, but not in attendance upon it, is at liberty, in a similar way, to carry such weapons.);" see also
Michael P. O'Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and
the Scope of "Bearing Arms"for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 654 & n. 351 (2012) (citing
Rosenthal and stating, "As a result, the legal, permitless carrying of a concealed handgun often takes the
colloquial name of 'Vermont carry.' ").
36 See, e.g., Rosenthal, 55 A. at 610-11.
* The jurisdictional counts are a rapidly moving target. The count ofjurisdictions provided in 2013
in Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2013) is:
Thirty-one States currently allow open carry of a handgun without a permit, twelve
States (including New Jersey) allow open carry with a permit, and seven States
prohibit open carry entirely. By contrast, four States and parts of Montana allow
concealed carry without a permit and forty-four States allow concealed carry with
a permit. One State, Illinois, prohibited public carry of handguns altogether, but
that law was struck down as violative of the Second Amendment by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in December 2012.
However, in 2016 alone, Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri and West Virginia eliminated the permit
requirement to carry a concealed weapon. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(4)(f) (Westlaw through 2016
Second Regular Session), amended by 2016 Idaho Senate Bill No. 1389, Idaho Sixty-Third Idaho
Legislature, Second Regular Session-2016 (adding, "(f) A concealed handgun by a person who is: (i)
Over twenty-one (21) years of age; (ii) A resident of Idaho; and (iii) Is not disqualified from being issued
a license under subsection (l1) of this section."); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 45-9-101(24) (Westlaw through
2016 First and Second Extraordinary Sessions and the 2016 Regular Session), amended by 2016 Miss.
Laws, H.B. No. 786 (approved April 15, 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (Westlaw through the end of
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Alternatively, state law may condition all or some types of public possession
on issuance of possessor-specific authorization.3 8
Among states that do not provide a blanket authorization for persons to
possess firearms in public, but, rather, require some possessor-specific
authorization to have been granted, there is a variation in the extent to which
nonresidents can be licensed and whether their out-of-state licenses will be
recognized. Some jurisdictions recognize all firearms permits;3 9 others
recognize only some;40 others do not recognize permits issued by other
the 2016 Regular Session and Veto Session of the 98th General Assembly), amended by 2016 Mo. Legis.
Serv. S.B. 656 (amending Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1), which defines "unlawful use of weapons" as
including some carrying of a concealed weapon, to limit the offense of unlawful use of weapons arising
from the carrying of a concealed weapon by adding the geographic limitation "into any area where
firearms are restricted under section 571.107"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-3 (Westlaw through
legislation of the 2016 Regular Session), amended by West Virginia House Bill 4145, at 2 (passed Feb.
24, 2016).
New Hampshire and North Dakota eliminated their permit requirements in 2017. S.B. 12, 2017 N.H.
Laws ch. 1; H.B. 1169,2017 N.D. Legis. Serv. No. 161 (West). Missouri's neighbor to the West, Kansas,
eliminated the permit requirement to possess a concealed firearm in 2015. See 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws
231, 237.
3 See supra note 37.
'9 E.g., Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.11 A (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); South Dakota, S.
D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7.4 (Westlaw through 2016 Session Laws), explained by South Dakota
Secretary of State, Which Out-of-State Permit Holders Can Carry Concealed in South Dakota? ("Any
valid resident or nonresident permit from another state is valid in South Dakota according to the terms
of the issuing state, as long as the South Dakota laws and rules are complied with (SDCL 23-7-7.4)."
https://sdsos.gov/services-for-individuals/concealed-pistol-permits/concealed-carry.aspx (last visited
July 19, 2016).
Kansas law formerly expressly recognized licenses and permits to carry concealed weapons issued
by other jurisdictions possessed by nonresidents of Kansas. See 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 231, 244 (striking
subsection (c)(1) of § 75-703, which provided, "(c)(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c)(2), a
valid license or permit to carry concealed weapons, issued by another jurisdiction, shall be recognized
by this state, but only while the holder is not a resident of Kansas."). Those 2015 statutory amendments
now no longer require a license for a person at least 21 to carry a firearm. 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 231,
237, 244 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6302) (deleting the provision, "Subject to the provisions of
subsection (c)(2), a valid license or permit to carry concealed weapons, issued by another jurisdiction,
shall be recognized by this state, but only while the holder is not a resident of Kansas."). For unclear
reasons, the web site of the Kansas Attorney General seems to continue to reference recognition of out-
of-state licenses (the distinction between recognition of out-of-state licenses and permit-free licensure of
out-of-state residents being significant for our purposes). Out-of-State License Recognition,
http://ag.ks.govlicensing/concealed-carry/out-of-state-license-recognition (last visited July 19, 2016).
40 E.g., Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714, subdiv. 16 (Westlaw through laws of the 2016
Regular Session effective through July 1, 2016) (providing state officer to publish a list of states having
laws goveming permit issuances not similar to Minnesota, for which recognition is denied); Nevada,
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202.3688.1, 202.3689 (Westlaw through the end of the 78th Regular Session
(2015) and 29th Special Session (2015)).
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jurisdictions.4 Some jurisdictions will not license nonresidents;42 others
will.43
A state may issue its residents permits (possessor-specific authorization)
even if resident possession does not require a permit," although it may not.45
This apparently anomalous process does have advantages beyond any
possible implications of the GFSZA. It can allow that state's residents to
benefit from reciprocity in other states that do not authorize public permit-
free carry or possession.
41 E.g., District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2509.01(4) (Westlaw through July 1, 2016)
(" 'License' means a license to carry a concealed pistol issued pursuant to § 22-4506."), id. § 22-4506
(not listing persons only licensed outside the District); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-
303 (Westlaw through 2016 Regular Session of the General Assembly in effect through July 1, 2016)
("A person shall have a permit issued under this subtitle before the person carries, wears, or transports a
handgun."), the pertinent subtitle, Title 5, Subtitle 3, does not contain any of "resident," "non-resident"
and "nonresident."
42 E.g., California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150(a)(3) (Westlaw through urgency legislation through
Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg. Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex. Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot)
(limiting issuance to persons resident in the county or city or having a principal place of employment or
business in the county or city); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(aXl) (Westlaw through laws
enacted during the 2016 Regular Session of the Kansas Legislature effective through June 30, 2016, and
chs. 1, 3 to 5, 7, 8, 10, 13 to 16, 18 to 26, 28, 30 to 35, 42, 43, 49, 52, 53, 56, 60, 61, 63, 65 to 69, 71 to
75, 77, 80 to 82, 86, 87, 90, 91, 96, 98 to 101, 103, 104, 106 to 109 and 112); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 571.101.2(1) (limiting licenses to Missouri residents, armed forces members stationed in Missouri and
spouses of such members) (Westlaw through 2016 Regular Session and Veto Session of the 98th General
Assembly). Delaware allows the issuance to a nonresident of up to three temporary licenses, each lasting
30 days. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1441(k) (Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016, ch. 427).
43 E.g., Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704(4)(a) (Westlaw through 2016 Second Special Session);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.06 (Westlaw through end of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
4 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c03 (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2016 Regular
Session of the Kansas Legislature effective through June 30, 2016, and chs. 1, 3 to 5, 7, 8, 10, 13 to 16,
18 to 26, 28, 30 to 35, 42, 43, 49, 52, 53, 56, 60, 61, 63, 65 to 69, 71 to 75, 77, 80 to 82, 86, 87, 90, 91,
96, 98 to 101, 103, 104, 106 to 109 and 112); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.107 (Westlaw through the end of
the 2016 Regular Session and Veto Session of the 98th General Assembly, pending changes received
from the Revisor of Statutes) (allowing for issuance of permits); id. § 571.030, amended by 2016 Mo.
Legis. Serv. S.B. 656 (amending Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1), which defines "unlawful use of
weapons" as including some carrying of a concealed weapon, to limit the offense of unlawful use of
weapons arising from the carrying of a concealed weapon by adding the geographic limitation "into any
area where firearms are restricted under section 571.107").
4 E.g., Jay Buckey, Firearms for Felons? A Proposal to Prohibit Felons from Possessing Firearms
in Vermont, 35 VT. L. REv. 957, 958 & n.8 ("Vermont does not at this time require or issue gun permits.")
(quoting Frequently Asked Questions, Vermont State Police, http://
www.dps.state.vt.us/vtsp/faql.html#VermontGun (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) (2011); Veronica Rose,
Reciprocity Agreements for Gun Permits, OLR Research Report 2007-R-0116 (Jan. 23, 2007),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-01 16.htm ("Vermont does not issue handgun permits. People
from any state including Connecticut, may carry handguns in the state without a permit.").
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III. LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF "LICENSED BY"
The pertinent provisions of the GFSZA present two separate interpretive
issues involving sets of persons who might benefit from the exemption from
the GFSZA. We may frame the interpretive issues as:
(i) whether the GFSZA allows reciprocity (specifically, whether it
prohibits delegation of an otherwise recognized licensure process to a
nonresident's state of residence); and
(ii) whether the GFSZA does not recognize licensure unless it
involves some possessor-specific action.
The more compact set of claimants presenting an interpretive issue
includes those who are nonresidents in the state containing the relevant
school zone, where the state containing the school zone has delegated to each
person's respective state of residence the determination of suitability to
possess a firearm through some form of licensure involving actual
application and issuance of some form of physical, licensee-specific permit.
One might think of this set of claimants as presenting the issue of recognition
of physical licenses through reciprocity of permits.
The broader set of claimants includes those who are authorized to possess
firearms in public spaces in a state, even if no licensee-specific application
has been approved. That could include a state that generally authorized
possession in proximity to a school zone without the need for any possessor-
specific application. In such a jurisdiction, there would be a question
whether the state authorization was effective under the GFSZA to authorize
possession of a firearm in proximity to an elementary or secondary school,
for residents and nonresidents alike.
Another, somewhat anomalous circumstance could present an issue of
authorization that was not licensee-specific. A state could require licensee-
specific authorization for its residents but authorize some possession by
nonresidents whose possession was lawful in their states of residence,
whether by permit or simply by a general (blanket) statutory provision.
Although such a statute would seem odd, a federal court recently reached an
analogous construction of the Illinois regulatory scheme as applied to a
nonresident's possession in a private home.46
In sum, then, we can identify two qualitatively different interpretive
issues associated with this exception to the GFSZA. One issue is whether
the GFSZA prohibits delegation of an otherwise sufficient licensure process
46 Mishaga v. Schmitz, 136 F. Supp. 3d 981 (C.D. 111. 2015). See infra notes 59-67 and
accompanying text.
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to a nonresident's state of residence - whether it prohibits reciprocity. The
second issue is whether automatic authorization to possess a firearm, without
any possessor-specific action having been taken, allows the authorized
person to be classified as "licensed."
This Article focuses on whether the GFSZA prohibits delegation of the
licensure process to a nonresident's state of residence. However, brief
discussion of whether the GFSZA recognizes all state authorization,
including authorization without licensee-specific action, is helpful in
illuminating the primary issue, for the following reason: If the GFSZA is
ambiguous as to whether the GFSZA restricts the manner in which a state
authorizes firearms possession, so that, inter alia, blanket authorization (one
not involving licensee-specific action) may be licensure, principles of
federalism, discussed below,47 will require the GFSZA be construed as
recognizing that licensure. Or, if the GFSZA is construed as to require some
possessor-specific action but is ambiguous as to whether the state where the
school zone is located can delegate the determination, the ambiguity will be
construed to allow the possession by the more narrow set of persons having
otherwise satisfactory out-of-state licenses.
A. Ambiguity Concerning Whether Licensure Includes Authorization not
Involving Possessor-Specific Action
Let us first examine whether, by virtue of the meaning of the term
"licensed," the GFSZA recognizes all state authorization - the potential
claim being that the GFSZA requires the authorization involve some
possessor-specific action. We can illustrate that the language is at least
ambiguous by reference to a few circumstances where a different statutory
scheme seems to contemplate one being treated as "licensed" even where no
licensee-specific action is taken by the putative licensor.
The Louisiana Nuclear Energy and Radiation Control Law provides for
assorted state licensing of activity.48 As detailed immediately below, the
regulatory scheme contemplates certain persons are treated as "licensed by"
a state agency automatically, i.e., without any licensee-specific activity.
The regulatory scheme provides for "general licenses" and "specific
licenses." The former are granted without any application.4 9 The definitions
provide, " 'Licenses' means general licenses and specific licenses.""o
47 See infra Part VII.
4 LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2101-30:2119 (Westlaw through the 2016 First Extraordinary Session).
4 Id. § 30:2103(5)(a).
s Id. § 30:2103(5).
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The statute and implementing regulations define the term "licensee." The
term means "any person who is licensed by the department in accordance
with this Chapter and regulations promulgated by the secretary."'
Holders of general licenses, meaning persons whose activity is authorized
without any licensee-specific action having been taken by the state agency,
are necessarily treated as "licensees" and, therefore, are considered as
"licensed by" the state agency. That follows because that is necessary to give
effect to the regulations implementing the statute.
For example, a regulation exempts "licensees" from "all the requirements
of this Chapter with respect to shipment or carriage of [specified] low-level
materials."52 Giving effect to these provisions requires "licensees" to include
those who are licensed under a general license (i.e., without any agency
having taken a licensee-specific action). So, giving effect to these provisions
requires persons authorized by statute, without any licensee-specific
activity, be considered as "licensed by [the state agency]."
We can turn to Pennsylvania to find a second example. Pennsylvania law
provides one cannot act as an agent of a dealer or hauler of domestic animals
unless "licensed by" a state department. The statute indicates what is
necessary to "license" an agent is mere designation of the agent by a private
person.54 Although the statute allows for the department to require additional
information, 5 the form would suggest that is unlikely to occur, as it only
requires the agent's name - it does not require even address information. 6
' Id. § 30:2103(4) (emphasis added).
52 33 LA. ADMIN. CODE Pt. XV, 1505(b) (Westlaw through rules published in Louisiana Register
Vol. 42, No. 5, May 20, 2016).
s3 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2342(a) (Westlaw through 2016 Regular Session Act 24).
* The statute provides in part:
(a) General rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b), a domestic animal or dead
domestic animal dealer or hauler who applies for or holds a dealer's or hauler's
license may designate any person to act as an agent on behalf of that dealer or
hauler. The designation shall be made either on the domestic animal or dead
domestic animal dealer's or hauler's license application form or by a written notice
to the department requesting the issuance of an agent's license. The department
may require such additional information as is necessary to determine the identity,
competency and eligibility of an applicant for an agent's license. A dealer or hauler




56 See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Health and
Diagnostic Services, Application for Domestic Animal Dealer and Hauler License ¶ 9 (Feb. 2016),
http://www.agriculture.pa.gov/Protect/AHDServices/Domestic%20Animal%2ODealers%20and%20Ha
ulers%20License/Pages/default.aspx#.VOrQOOTAZrY (last visited May 30, 2016).
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Thus, for this purpose, one can be "licensed by" Pennsylvania without the
state doing anything licensee-specific. 57
It turns-out that interpretation of this aspect of the term "licensed," as
used in the Illinois statutes governing firearms possession, has been
litigated." The authority is in conflict. One case interprets the term as
including one who is authorized by generally applicable statute (i.e., without
licensee-specific action by the state), and one does not.
The former case is Mishaga v. Schmitz.59 It involves a challenge to Illinois
law that restricts issuance of Firearm Owner's Identification Cards to state
residents. The plaintiff applied for a FOID, which was denied for want of
Illinois identification that, as a nonresident, she did not have.60 An Ohio
resident, she allegedly wished to possess a firearm for self-defense while
staying at her friends' home in Illinois.6 1 The opinion notes:
[The plaintiff] also does not have any sort of firearm permit
from her state of residence, Ohio, because Ohio does not
issue permits merely to possess a firearm and because [the
plaintiff] does not want the permit Ohio does issue that
7 One can encounter similar examples. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2636.5(c) (Westlaw
through urgency legislation through Ch. 14 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex. Sess.)
(allowing physical therapists licensed out-of-state to practice in-state temporarily following receipt of
notice an application is on-file); Los Angeles Municipal Code, Ch. I (Planning & Zoning Code), Art. 2,
§§ 12.70(B)(8), 12.70(B)(17), 12.70(C) (current through Revision No. 54, including legislation adopted
through March 31, 2016) (Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, ed.), http://library.amlegal.com (separately
regulating massage parlors, with an exception for businesses providing services of physical therapists
"licensed by the State of California").
* Somewhat comparable language was also construed by a Michigan court in People v. Miller, 604
N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). There the court finds that a blanket approval in a nonresident's home
state does not result in that "person holding a valid license to carry a pistol concealed upon his or her
person issued by another state." Id. at 782-83 (emphasis omitted) (construing MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.231a(1)(a), amended by 2002 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 82 (H.B. 5026) (West 2002)). A basic
difference in that language is its reference to one "holding" a license, which connotes something that is
physical that can be possessed. The court's analysis does not focus on that, however, and is simply
conclusory:
Defendant's argument would have us read into the statute a provision that it should
not apply under circumstances where a general exemption from concealed
weapons proscriptions would apply in some other state. Had the Legislature
intended that broader protection for out-of-state residents found with weapons in
Michigan, it could easily have written the statute in this fashion. The Legislature
did not take that approach, and we are without authority to rewrite the statute as
defendant suggests.
Miller, 604 N.W.2d at 783.
" 136 F. Supp. 3d 981 (C.D. 111. 2015).
6 Id. at 985.
61 Id. at 984.
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would license her to carry a concealed firearm outside of the
home.62
The relevant statutory scheme prohibits nonresident firearms possession
unless the nonresident was "licensed or registered to possess a firearm in
[his or her] resident state."63 The court holds the plaintiffs statutory
authorization to possess a firearm in Ohio makes her "licensed ... to possess
[a] firearm[] in [her] resident state[],"64 i.e., that authorization not involving
possessor-specific action constitutes licensure.
To reach that conclusion, the court first references assorted dictionary
definitions of "license" and correlative terms, concluding the term is
ambiguous in this regard:
Due to the consistent occurrence of equally valid,
competing definitions, then, an examination of dictionaries
to discern the plain meaning of the words "license" and
"licensed," alone, does not resolve the parties' dispute.
Though many definitions show that a document generally
or usually manifests the official permission granted in a
"license," as [the plaintiff] contends, the same definitions
make clear that such official permission in the absence of a
document is also central to the concept of "license,"
supporting Defendants' view.65
Ultimately, the court relies on the canon for avoiding surplusage (in light
of the disjunctive statutory reference to persons "licensed or registered" 66)
in reaching its conclusion.6 7
This court's conclusion that licensure includes authorization not
requiring licensee-specific action operated to limit the extent to which a
private person's firearms rights were vindicated. In something of a common
theme,68 a subsequent Illinois case also construed this language against one
asserting firearms rights, albeit in that case to reach the conclusion that
licensure requires licensee-specific action.
62 Id. at 984-85.
63 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(b)(10) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-912 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)
(amended in 2012 and 2015).
* Mishaga, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 996.
6s Id. at 992.
66 See supra note 6363.
61 Mishaga, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 992-93.
1 See supra note 58.
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People v. Wiggins69 involves a Texas resident convicted in Illinois of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.70 Earlier Illinois authority, People v.
Holmes,71  holds the above-referenced exemption 72  for "licensed"
nonresidents at issue in Mishaga v. Schmitz73 "functions as an exception to
liability under the [aggravated unlawful use of a weapon] statute." 74
Although defendant Wiggins could lawfully possess a firearm in his home
state of Texas without a permit, 5 the court concludes the term "licensed" in
this statute is not ambiguous, 76 and the term does not extend to the blanket
authorization provided by Texas law.77 It bolsters its conclusion by reference
to legislative history78 and the need to harmonize this language with other
statutory language.79 And it makes the interesting argument that because the
statutory language is part of creation of an administrative scheme, the term
"licensed" is to be read as excluding some form of authorization not
involving licensee-specific action,80 which is, of course, at odds with the
import of the Louisiana regulation of hazardous waste referenced above that
does create an administrative regulatory scheme. '
One can distinguish the approach taken in Wiggin from the interpretive
issue presented by the GFSZA in the following fashion. The statutory
69 68 N.E.3d 457 (lll. App. Ct. 2016).
70 Id. at 461.
" 948 N.E.2d 617 (111. 2011).
72 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
7 136 F. Supp. 3d 981 (C.D. 111. 2015).
74 Wiggins, 68 N.E.3d at 462.
s Id. at 463.
7 Id. at 468.
n Id. at 470.
71 Id. at 467-68.
' Id. at 466-67.
s The opinion states:
This point is significant because, in the sense of a regulatory statute, the word
"licensed" does not strike us as ambiguous at all. "In the context of professional
regulation, a license is defined as 'a right or permission granted in accordance with
law by a competent authority to engage in some business or occupation, to do
some act, or to engage in some transaction which but for such license would be
unlawful.' " Christmas v. Dr. Donald W. Hugar, Ltd., 409 Ill. App. 3d 91, 96
(2011) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1304
(1981)); see also Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 453 (1900) (defining
"license" in context of regulatory statute governing plumbing to be "a formal
permission from proper authorities to perform certain acts or carry on a certain
business which without such permission would be illegal"). Again, the point is
that there must be official action by the government to permit the activity, which
otherwise has been rendered illegal by that government.
Id. at 465-66.
" See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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scheme at issue in Wiggin necessarily involves some licensee-specific
activity in some contexts. It creates a mechanism in which the governmental
unit adopting the regulatory scheme in fact issues some permits to specific
individuals. Of course, the GFSZA does not involve the federal government
issuing any permits, and to say that it necessarily contemplates states doing
so assumes the conclusion.
In sum, there are regulatory schemes that use the term "license," and
correlative terms, to include authorizations not involving the licensing
jurisdiction taking licensee-specific action. And there is judicial authority to
the contrary. Whether the meaning becomes clear when placed in the context
of the relevant statutory purposes is examined below. 82
B. Efficacy ofRecognition through Reciprocity ofAnother State's Licensure
Involving Licensee-Specific Activity
Part III.A urges that the GFSZA's use of "licensed" likely is, before
reference is made to the statutory purposes, ambiguous as to whether
"licensed" excludes persons authorized by statute without any licensee-
specific action being taken. If that term is ambiguous in this regard, and,
under federalism principles discussed below,83 it is construed so as not to
prevent a particular manner in which a state decides to act (whether through
broad statutory grant as opposed to licensee-specific action), then
nonresidents authorized by a state's reciprocity to possess firearms would be
persons licensed by that state.
Were a court to reject that approach, there remains a more narrow path to
recognition of those nonresidents benefitting from reciprocity as licensed.
That would depend on finding that the term "licensed .. . by the State," as
used in the GFSZA, did not unambiguously prohibit the relevant state's
delegation of authorization to nonresidents' jurisdictions of residence -
unambiguously allowed it or at least is ambiguous in that regard.
In a variety of contexts, the term "licensed by the state," or the phrase
"licensed by" preceding reference to some other governmental entity, is used
where the term would seem naturally to extend to one who has been licensed
by reciprocity - licensed without any licensee-specific affirmative act of
the jurisdiction whose licensing is in issue. We can provide a few
illustrations.
82 See infra Part V.
8 See infra Part VII.
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Of course, automatic recognition of a nonresident's driver's license is a
very familiar form of automatic reciprocity. 84 State statutory schemes
involving drivers' licenses often use language more explicit than "licensed
by the state" in addressing licensees and application of reciprocity principles
- the language often is drafted in a fashion that very directly clarifies its
application to nonresidents." One exception, where there is statutory
language using the construct "licensed by the state," without express
discussion of reciprocity, is provided by Louisiana law.
By way of background, section 32:404 of the Louisiana Driver's License
Law expressly contemplates recognition of a nonresident minor's86 out-of-
state license:
A. A nonresident or a nonresident minor, who has been
licensed to drive or operate a motor vehicle under the laws
of his home state and who has in his immediate possession
a valid license issued to him by his home state, shall be
permitted to drive a motor vehicle in this state without
examination or license for a period not to exceed ninety
days ....
B. A student attending a Louisiana school but who is
domiciled in another state, and who has in his immediate
possession both a valid license issued to him by his home
state and a current student identification card, shall be
permitted to drive a motor vehicle in this state without
84 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.04 (Westlaw through 2016 Second Regular Session) ("(1) The
following persons are exempt from obtaining a driver license: ... (c) A nonresident who is at least 16
years of age and who has in his or her immediate possession a valid noncommercial driver license issued
to the nonresident in his or her home state or country operating a motor vehicle of the type for which a
Class E driver license is required in this state."); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.030 (Westlaw through
2015 Regular Session).
1s See, e.g., supra note 84; infra note 87 and accompanying text.
86 The section of the code providing definitions for this chapter does not include a definition of
minor. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 32:401 (Westlaw through the 2016 First Extraordinary, Regular, and
Second Extraordinary Sessions). There is, however, a general statutory definition of the converse case.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 29 (Westlaw through the 2016 First Extraordinary, Regular, and Second
Extraordinary Sessions) ("Majority is attained upon reaching the age of eighteen years.") One can see,
however, administrative rule reference confirming the term "minor" is used in this portion of the
Louisiana statutes to reference persons not yet eighteen. See 55 LA. ADMrN. CODE Pt. III, § 147(B)(3)
(Westlaw through 42 La. Reg. No. 11, Nov. 20, 2016) (imposing the following obligation on driving
schools: "The school shall provide a written document detailing the services to be provided for the fee
charged. This document shall be signed by the parent (if the student is a minor) or a student (if over the
age of eighteen) and the school owner.").
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examination or Louisiana license during his enrollment as a
student and for not more than ninety days thereafter."
The relevant language using the phrase "licensed by the state" is in a
separate provision addressing vehicle operation by persons under seventeen:
No person shall cause or knowingly permit his child or
ward, under the age of seventeen years, to drive a motor
vehicle or a power cycle upon any public road or highway
unless such child or ward is licensed by the state to do so.8 8
As used there, "licensed by the state" would appear to include minors
licensed by reciprocity. If not, it contemplates that licensed nonresidents
sixteen years of age either cannot lawfully drive in Louisiana (which does
not seem intended by the quoted section 32:404), or they can, but a parent is
not to authorize it. Neither seems likely intended, although authority directly
on the matter has not been located.
This illustration from Louisiana law is imperfect, because one might
quibble with the conclusion that the statute intends to license the
nonresidents who are sixteen. We began with that statute, because drivers'
licensure immediately comes to the mind of many when considering
licensure reciprocity. The following illustration from Maryland law, albeit
involving a less familiar form of reciprocity, unambiguously contemplates
licensure involving automatic recognition.89
Section 5-512 of Maryland's Family Law allows for automatic
reciprocity to those licensed by another state for "exercis[ing] care, custody,
or control of minor children or . .. engag[ing] in the placement of minor
children."90 A separate section, section 5-507, states, "Except as otherwise
provided in this section, a person shall be licensed by the Administration as
87 LA. STAT. ANN. § 32:404.
8 Id. § 32:416.
89 One can find other examples. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-27B-3(A) (Westlaw through the Second
Regular and Special Sessions of the 52nd Legislature (2016)) (requiring one be "licensed by the
department" to act as a private investigator); id. § 61-27B-33 (allowing the department to develop rules
allowing for reciprocity on a temporary or limited basis "without requiring an applicant licensed or
registered in another state subject to a reciprocity agreement to be licensed or registered in New
Mexico").
" MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-512 (Westlaw through Chapters I to 9, 12, 16, 26 (except secs.
4 & 5), 28, 100, 103, 116, 142, 160, 180, 237, 241, 294 (except sec. 2), 305, 472, 525, 526, 558 & 559
of the 2016 Regular Session of the General Assembly) ("If the other state extends the same recognition
and reciprocal relations to licensees under this subtitle, the Administration may recognize and deal with
a person licensed or recognized by any other state as being authorized to exercise care, custody, or control
of minor children or to engage in the placement of minor children.").
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a child placement agency before the person may engage in the placement of
minor children in homes or with individuals." 9 1 The efficacy of the
reciprocity provided to place minors in section 5-512 requires that one
authorized by automatic reciprocity in section 5-512 be treated as "licensed
by the Administration" in section 5-507.92
C. Illustrations Where not Treating Reciprocity as Making One "Licensed
by " an Entity Creates Anomalies
We also have circumstances where (i) there is statutory language making
reference to one "licensed by" a governmental entity, (ii) there is some form
of automatic reciprocity, and (iii) it makes little sense for one who benefits
from reciprocity not to be treated as "licensed by" the governmental entity.
That is, it would be possible for one who benefits from reciprocity not to be
treated as "licensed by" the government granting reciprocity, but there is not
an evident reason why that should be the case.
These illustrations are different from those provided in Part III.B, in that
in those illustrations, the statutory language would not work (or work as very
likely intended) absent treating one as being "licensed by" a government that
took no action other than the adoption of reciprocity. In the following
illustrations, the statutory language could work were reciprocity not treated
as making one "licensed by" the jurisdiction, although it would not produce
sensible results and is, therefore, not a suitable interpretation of the meaning
of "licensed by.""
South Carolina law provides certain certified public accountants having
out-of-state principal places of business "may exercise all the privileges of
91 Id. § 5-507.
92 One might argue reciprocity is given effect under the statutory scheme without requiring one
granted reciprocity be treated as "licensed by" the state agency, for the following reason: Section 5-507
does not prohibit child placement by licensed persons, and it also does not prohibit child placements "as
otherwise provided." So, one might argue that recognition by reciprocity is "as otherwise provided."
Thus, one might argue, persons recognized by reciprocity can place children, but are not treated as
"licensed by" the state agency.
That argument, however, does not track the full statutory language. The authorization of child
placement by persons who are not licensed is limited to "as otherwise provided in this section." The
section reference there is section 5-507. The reciprocity is provided in a different section, section 5-512.
So, giving effect to reciprocity requires persons benefitting from reciprocity are considered as "licensed
by" the state agency.
93 See generally 2A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:12 (7th ed.) (Westlaw, database updated Nov. 2015) ("A statute is the solemn and
purposeful result of a state acting through its legislature to achieve an effective, operative, nonfutile end.
Consonant with this idea of a deliberate, rational, and sensible legislative process, a golden rule of
statutory interpretation instructs that, when one of several possible interpretations of an ambiguous statute
produces an unreasonable result, that interpretation should be rejected in favor of another which produces
a reasonable result." (footnotes omitted)).
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licensees of this State without the need to obtain a license." 94 The statute
expressly provides, "[N]o notice, fee, or other submission may be required
of the individual." 9 5
South Carolina law further provides, in section 15-36-100, an additional
precondition to maintaining a professional negligence lawsuit against certain
professionals "licensed by or registered with the State of South Carolina" -
the filing of an affidavit of an expert witness specifying at least one negligent
act or omission.9 6 So, an out-of-state certified public accountant benefitting
from reciprocity either (i) is treated as "licensed by . .. the State," as used in
section 15-36-100, or (ii) does not benefit from the procedure limiting non-
meritorious malpractice litigation. Although no authority addressing the
issue has been found,97 there does not appear to be any reason why an out-
of-state certified public accountant, authorized to practice by automatic
reciprocity, would not be treated as "licensed by" South Carolina for
purposes of this statute. Thus, one supposes those certified public
accountants benefitting from reciprocity are treated as "licensed by" the
state.
Pennsylvania allows "vehicle dealers licensed under [the Pennsylvania
Board of Vehicles Act] or by any other state or jurisdiction" to sell vehicles
at auction in Pennsylvania." Pennsylvania law elsewhere provides "an
assignment and warranty of title" for a transfer of ownership of a vehicle is
to be verified by a notary, a similar official or, inter alia, an "issuing agent
who is licensed as a vehicle dealer by the State Board of Vehicle
Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons, or its employee." 99 The phrase
"licensed as a vehicle dealer by the State Board" would here seem
necessarily to include persons licensed by automatic reciprocity.
D. Conclusion
The ATF's proffered interpretation of the term "licensed . .. by the State"
in the Gun-Free School Zones Act relies on an assumption that the term
"licensed by," when followed by "the state" or reference to some other
governmental unit, requires some licensee-specific affirmative act of the
94 S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-2-245(A) (Westlaw through 2016 Act No. 147).
9 Id. § 40-2-245(B).
9 Id. § 15-36-100.
1 Westlaw search: adv: "15-36-100" & "accountant," Jurisdiction South Carolina & All Federal
(May 30, 2016), identifying only one case, Hays v. Pearlman, No. 2:10-CV-1 135-DCN, 2010 WL
4510956 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2010); the case does not involve a certified public accountant as a defendant.
9 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 818.5 (Westlaw through 2016 Regular Session Act 24);
see also 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 818.1 (providing the short title of the act).
9 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1111 (Westlaw through 2016 Regular Session Act 24).
162 [Vol. XXXII: 13 9
Federalism & Reciprocity under the GFSZA
licensing state (or other governmental unit). However, the use of the term
"licensed by the state," and correlative terms, are not so restricted.
Giving evident effect to statutory language in a number of contexts
requires that one authorized by a governmental entity simply by statute
making it so for numerous people is sufficient for one to be "licensed."
Although there is inconsistent treatment in judicial opinions, that
inconsistency at least creates ambiguity. The conclusion that at least
ambiguity is present is even more compelling in determining whether the
term "licensed by . . . the State" extends to licensure through reciprocity
where the state whose licensure is recognized granted licensee-specific
approval. And, as shown below,' 0 in this context ambiguity would be
construed so as to find the activity constitutes licensure.
IV. PROMINENT REFERENCE TO PURPOSE-CENTRIC
INTERPRETATION: "ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE"
A detailed discussion of the terms of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act 0 ' would be too far afield. But because construction of
the term "established by the State," as used there, was prominently addressed
in King v. Burwell,10 2 and that construct is similar to "licensed by the State,"
as used in the GFSZA, some brief mention of King v. Burwell is appropriate.
In Burwell, the Court concludes the term "established by the State" is
ambiguous, because taking the term in "its most natural sense"0 3 - to
exclude an exchange that was not established by a state but, rather, was
established by the federal government - would yield results that "would be
odd indeed."'" Moreover, the court reaches that conclusion even though it
results in the usage of the phrase, in the critical location, being entirely
superfluous, contrary to the cardinal' principle of construction requiring
avoidance of interpretations that make some language surplusage.' 0 7
In both cases, the question is whether the activity - "licens[ing]" for
purposes of the GFSZA, and "establish[ing]" for purposes of The Patient
'" See infra Part VII.F.
'' Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010).
102 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
o Id. at 2490.
'0 Id. at 2490 n. 1.
o Id. at 2492.
'" E.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is 'a cardinal principle of statutory
construction' that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.' " (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533
U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
107 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
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Protection and Affordable Care Act - is required to be done by a referenced
state. It would seem easier to conclude the term "licensed ... by the State"
includes a state voluntarily licensing firearms possession through reciprocity
than it is to conclude that an exchange established by the federal
government, after a state declined, is "established by the State."
Or, to put it another way, the ATF's view is that the GFSZA is
unambiguous in rejecting licensure by reciprocity. The ATF states the
statutory language "clearly provides ... the license must be issued by the
State in which the school zone is located or a political subdivision of that
State.""os Focusing on the literal terms, this language in the GFSZA is more
easily found ambiguous than the corresponding language construed in
Burwell, which the Supreme Court holds is ambiguous. And that conclusion
is further cemented by the fact that rejecting the ATF's reasoning, unlike the
interpretation adopted in Burwell, does not require making the last three
words in the phrase being construed, "licensed. . .by the State," surplusage.
V. INTERPRETATION OF "LAW ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISION
VERIFY"
A. Recognition through Reciprocity of Out-of-State Licensure Involving
Licensee-Specific Action
Parts III and IV have demonstrated that the phrases "licensed by the state"
and "licensed by [a governmental entity]" at times are used to reference
circumstances where the licensing state or other governmental entity takes
no action other than the prior adoption of a law or regulation (whether by
some blanket authorization or by reciprocity, delegating licensure decision-
making as to nonresidents to another state). However, there is a second part
of the exclusion in the GFSZA that must be parsed to conclude the language
does not prohibit licensure by automatic reciprocity. The statutory exclusion
also requires "the law enforcement authorities of the State or political
subdivision verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the
license." 09
As an initial matter, one can note that ATF's analysis does not focus on
the additional language. So, ATF apparently does not rely on this additional
language as the basis for its conclusion.
"' Letter from Ashan Benedict to Tim Gillespie, supra note 17, at I (emphasis added).
'9 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) (2015) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
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The primary reason why this part of the GFSZA also does not prohibit
licensure through reciprocity is that it cannot be intended that this
verification will be effected without delegation. Confirming firearms
possession is lawful under federal law will require delegation. For example,
the actual verification contemplated by Missouri law, beyond Missouri-
based officials taking the licensee's fingerprints, is performed only by
federal officials. "0
Legislation is construed so as to make it effective in achieving its
purposes."' Because delegation is necessary to effective implementation of
the scheme, it cannot be intended that a state cannot delegate this checking
to another governmental entity.
Some of the language in United States v. Taitll2 provides a second,
independent basis for concluding that this reference to verification does not
prohibit delegation. The case involves someone who had been issued a
firearms permit in Alabama, notwithstanding prior convictions in another
state (Michigan). Alabama law at the time had only limited restrictions on
the prior bad acts that would absolutely disqualify one from receiving a
firearms permit - restrictions as to criminal acts more narrow than the
federal prohibition on firearms possession:
(i) that the person not have been convicted of a crime of
violence; or
"o Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.101.5(1) (Westlaw through emergency legislation approved through
February 18, 2016, of the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 98th General Assembly).
Note, for example, that where Virginia licenses a nonresident, the fingerprints are not taken by
Virginia officials. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.06 (Westlaw through the end of 2015 Reg. Sess. and
includes 2016 Reg. Sess. cc. I to 4, 19, 55, 71, 79 to 80, 279, 290, 385 and 648). It is implausible that
Federal law dictates which state's employees take fingerprints. There is no nexus between that and any
justification for burdening an enumerated right. It would be dubious even under rational basis review.
II E.g., Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 124 (1902) ("There is a presumption against a
construction which would render a statute ineffective or inefficient, or which would cause grave public
injury or even inconvenience."); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pinder, 812 P.2d 645, 648 (Colo. 1991) ("Our
primary task in interpreting a statute is to give it a construction and interpretation that will render it
effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted."); Ortiz v. N. Amherst Auto Rental,
Inc., 834 N.E.2d 273, 275-76 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) ("In analyzing § 32C, '[wie must ascertain the intent
of a statute from all of its parts, from the subject matter to which it relates, and we must [then] construe
it so as to render the legislation effective, consonant with reason and common sense.' . . . If the
[international driving permit] cannot be used as a representation of the fact that the driver has a driver's
license, then it would have no real use at all, aside from serving as another form of photographic
identification. We regard the language in the Convention on Road Traffic ... as an indication that the
countries involved meant to introduce the IDP as a proxy for a driver's license in a limited number of
circumstances, and we conclude that this is one of those circumstances." (quoting Bay Colony Mktg. Co.
v. Fruit Salad, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 156
(Westlaw, database through July 2016 update) ("A statute should not be construed in such manner as to
render it partly ineffective or inefficient if another construction will make it effective.").
112 202 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2000).
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(ii) that the person not be a drug addict or habitual
drunkard."'
The defendant's prosecution for violation of the GFSZA was dismissed,
which was affirmed on appeal." 4 The appellate court reaches the conclusion,
disputed by the government, that Michigan law automatically restoring the
defendant's rights following release from custody"' operated to allow his
firearms possession under Alabama law." 6
With that background, we can turn to the issue at hand: the court's
holding concerning what verification prior to issuance of a permit is
necessary if the permit is to satisfy the requirements of the GFSZA.
Somewhat surprisingly, both the appellate court's and the trial court's
opinions are cryptic in a crucial regard: whether the sheriff who issued the
permit did any checking to assure that the defendant was not prohibited from
receiving a license. But the appellate opinion apparently reaches the
following conclusion: Whether the sheriff checked that the licensee could
"3 See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a)-b) (Westlaw Alabama Statutes Annotated-1997) (amended
2013 & 2015) ("(a) No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of committing or
attempting to commit a crime of violence shall own a pistol or have one in his or her possession or under
his or her control. (b) No person who is a drug addict or an habitual drunkard shall own a pistol or have
one in his or her possession or under his or her control.").
The district court details how the statutory provisions operate to provide this result. The permit
statute, at the time, generally allowed issuance if "it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear
injury to his person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol, and that he is a
suitable person to be so licensed." Id. § 13A-l 1-75 (quoted in part in Tait, 202 F.3d at 1324). That part
of the statute did not expressly reference specific wrongful acts that would constitute an outright
prohibition. However, the district court noted prior authority "has interpreted this law as prohibiting a
sheriff 'from issuing a license to carry a pistol to a person who, by operation of law, would be ineligible
for such a license.' " United States v. Tait, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1999), affd, 202 F.3d
1320 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting E.M. v. State, 675 So.2d 90, 92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)).
11 202 F.3d at 1321.
" Id. at 1322.
116 Id. at 1325.
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lawfully receive a permit under Alabama law is irrelevant, because the
license in fact was not prohibited by Alabama law"l 7 from being issued."'
' The GFSZ requires verification that the person be "qualified under law to receive the license."
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). The statutory language does
not expressly indicate that it means one is qualified under state law, even if the possession would violate
federal law. The Tait court only obliquely addresses a possible argument that the GFSZA conditions the
efficacy of a permit on a background check not revealing any violation of federal law in the applicant's
possession of a firearm. It simply concludes the relevant law is state law. Tait, 202 F.3d at 1324 ("By its
basic terms, the statute merely requires that the Alabama sheriff ensured that Tait was qualified under
Alabama law to receive the license.").
The district court discusses the federal government's apparent claim that state licensure does not
satisfy the GFSZA unless it confirms the firearms possession is lawful under federal law, by referencing
the background check necessary to purchase a firearm in section 922(t):
The government argues that Congress intended that the verification of licensees
include background checks and that Alabama's licensing procedure does not meet
this requirement. First, the government offers a letter issued by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms explaining to Alabama firearm's [sic] licensees
regarding their responsibilities under a separate firearms provision. Apparently,
the government would have the Court infer from this letter that the ATF believes
that Alabama's licensing procedure does not satisfy the verification requirements
of § 922(t) and, therefore, does not meet the verification requirements of §
922(q)(2)(B).
United States v. Tait, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1999).
It bears mentioning that were Tait not to have rejected the federal government's construction of the
GFSZA, the implications would have been quite broad. For example, federal law makes unlawful the
possession of a firearm by one who is an unlawful user of any controlled substance (as defined), subject
to an interstate commerce nexus. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
Marijuana is such a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 802(6), 812, Schedule I(c)(10) (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 114-327). And the federal prohibition on its use is not eliminated by alleged
medicinal purposes. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005); see also Wilson v. Lynch, No. 14-
15700, 2016 WL 4537376 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2016) (rejecting a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3)'s ban
on sales of firearms to individuals whom sellers have reasonable cause to believe are drug users, along
with ATF guidance to firearms licensees stating persons using medical marijuana are prohibited by
federal law from possessing firearms or ammunition) (citing Arthur Herbert, Assistant Director,
Enforcement Programs and Services, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Open Letter
to all Federal Firearms Licensees (Sept. 21, 2011), https://www.atf.gov/files/press/releases/201 1/
09/092611 -atf-open-letter-to-all-ffls-marijuana-for-medicinal-purposes.pdf).
Oregon, for example, maintains a registry entitling persons to use medical marijuana, evidenced by
identification cards. OR. REv. STAT. § 475B.415 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. legislation eff.
through July 1, 2016). As noted below, see infra notes 178-181 and accompanying text, the Oregon
Supreme Court has held that a local official cannot decline to issue a state firearms permit to one
possessing a state medical marijuana card. Were the construction of the GFSZA proffered by the federal
government in Tait correct, and the required background check needed to be at least marginally adequate,
an Oregon firearms permit would not entitle a licensee who could possess a firearm under federal law to
possess a firearm in an area covered by the GFSZA.
To detail the analysis: The felon prohibition addressed in Tait is in the same section as the prohibition
on unlawful users of controlled substances. If the federal government had been correct in Tait that the
effectiveness of a license, under the GFSZA, required the issuing state to check records of felony
convictions, it would also require checking of records of unlawful users of marijuana. And, because
Oregon does not prohibit issuance of firearms licenses to medical marijuana users, under the federal
government's approach, the private bearing of firearms in covered locations would be prohibited in
Oregon (and other states with similar laws).
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B. Recognition of Permit-Free Licensure - Licensure not Involving
Licensee-Specific Action
If licensure involves no governmental unit actually ascertaining that the
licensee is authorized to possess a firearm, e.g., permit-free carry, there is a
substantial question whether the principle against construction of statutory
language as surplusage would result in such licensure not satisfying the
requirements of the GFSZA. As noted above,"' there clearly is authority
that would indicate a person authorized by statute to engage in some activity,
without any licensee-specific action by any state, can be considered
"licensed by the State." However, construing the language to extend to
someone who is authorized under these permit-free procedures could make
redundant the following statutory language:
"1 In particular, the court states:
The government argues that Alabama's licensing requirements are so relaxed that
they will always fail to qualify their licensees for the § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) exception.
The government maintains that Congress envisioned a background check when
drafting the exception. This would require states to check for prior felonies before
issuing firearms licenses. If the state failed to do so, their licenses would be valid
for state purposes, but the licensees would not garner the § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii)
protections. While the government's argument is persuasive, it misses the point.
Tait's civil rights were fully restored by operation of Michigan law; hence, even
if Alabama had conducted a background check, Tait would have qualified for the
license so long as Alabama allowed former felons to possess firearms. Whether
Tait qualified for a license under Alabama laws is discussed later in this opinion.
Having determined that Alabama's licensing procedure is not relevant to this
appeal, we decline to decide whether, in general, Alabama's licensing procedure
qualifies its licensees for § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) protections.
Tait, 202 F.3d at 1324 n.7.
The district court, on the other hand, took the position that the permit satisfied the GFSZA because
the sheriff was required to engage in some verification but, evidently, that it need not include a
background check (perhaps simply an affirmation from the applicant):
Since a sheriff must [sic] may issue a license only to a suitable person and
state law defines who is suitable, i.e. who is eligible to possess a pistol, it follows
that the sheriff must verify that any person to whom he issues a license is
"qualified under law" as required by § 922(q)(2)(B).
The government argues that Congress intended that the verification of
licensees include background checks and that Alabama's licensing procedure does
not meet this requirement.... [I]f Congress intended that the § 922(q)(2) exception
would apply only if the state used a specific type of verification procedure it could
have said so. It did not.
Tait, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (citation omitted).
"I See supra Part lIl.A.
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the law of the State or political subdivision requires that,
before an individual obtains such a license, the law
enforcement authorities of the State or political subdivision
verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive
the license.1 2 0
Although it is a cardinal canon of construction that statutory language not
be construed so as to make some language surplusage, Burwell illustrates
that canon can be avoided where its application yields odd results.1 21 The
interpretive principles arising from federalism norms, referenced below,1 2 2
could also be sufficient to negate application of that canon - and in fact
have in other litigation negated that canon.'23 We shall leave our
observations on permit-free carry at that.
VI. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES Do NOT SUPPORT THE ATF's
INTERPRETATION
Of course, a statute is construed in light of its purposes.1 24 Those may be
divined from the structure of the statute as a whole.1 25 Or, as in the case of
the GFSZA in its current form, the statutory language may expressly state
the intended purposes.1 26 Reference to those purposes might, in some cases,
eliminate ambiguity otherwise present. However, as we shall see, neither
120 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
121 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
122 See infra Part Vill.
123 See infra notes 294-296 and accompanying text.
124 E.g., Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[T]he decisions are legion in which
they have refused to be bound by the letter, when it frustrates the patent purpose of the whole
statute . . . . As Holmes, J., said in a much-quoted passage from Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30,
32 (1st Cir. 1908): 'it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving
at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.' Of course it is true that the words
used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting
the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes
of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." (citations and parallel citation omitted)), af'd, 326 U.S.
404 (1945); In re Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994) ("Thus, our primary task in
construing a statute is to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies and with
the obvious purposes of the Legislature, by viewing the statute in light of the circumstances that
motivated its passage." (citation omitted)). See generally 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 93, § 45:9
(discussing legislative purpose and public policy).
125 E.g., 2A SINGER& SINGER, supra note 93, § 46:5 ("The meaning of a statute is determined, not
from special words in a single sentence or section, but from the statute as a whole and viewing the
legislation in light of its general purpose.").
126 See infra text accompanying note 127.
Journal ofLaw & Politics
reference to the currently codified purposes nor reference to the structure of
the act as a whole eliminates ambiguity, so that it is not clear that licensure
through reciprocity is intended to be excluded as a permitted method.
A. The Codified Purposes
Let us first turn to the codified purposes. In essence, they assert that
firearms crime in school zones has an adverse impact on education, and
states (and their subdivisions), even those that have made substantial efforts
to prevent firearms-related crime, "find it almost impossible to handle gun-
related crime by themselves ... due in part to the failure or inability of other
states or localities to take strong measures."' 27 This author's ultimate
conclusion is that these codified purposes do not illuminate the meaning of
the licensure exception, because those express purposes are difficult to
harmonize with the contours of the exception for licensed persons. Were the
federal statute simply to enhance enforcement of violations of state law, by
making violation of state law a federal crime, that would address the concern
that states need assistance in enforcing their laws. Those purposes do not
support a federal limit on the manner in which a state can license possession.
So, they do not support adding content to the relevant statutory language
concerning the manner of licensure.
The express purposes are, frankly, cryptic in light of the relevant statutory
language concerning licensure mechanisms. The purposes were codified in
1994,128 four years after initial adoption of the GFSZA,129 following the
prosecution of one Lopez but before the Court's decision in the litigation on
127 The statute identifies assorted harms sought to be addressed, including:
(E) while criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens and foreign
visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due to concern
about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may decline to send their
children to school for the same reason;
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in the
quality of education in our country;
(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on interstate
commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States; [and]
(H) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to handle gun-
related crime by themselves - even States, localities, and school systems that
have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related crime find their
efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of other States or localities
to take strong measures[.]
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(1)(E)-(H) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
128 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108
Stat. 1796, 2125-26 (1994).
129 Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45
(1990) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)).
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appeal in United States v. Lopezl30 that the then-existing statute was not
authorized by the Commerce Clause.' 3 ' Consistent with that context, the
purposes are clearly designed to pronounce alleged adverse impacts.
The reference to conduct in one state influencing activity in another state
might support, if constitutional, a federally mandated minimum review prior
to licensure to possess a firearm in a school zone. But the prohibition does
not provide such a substantive minimum. So, as the statutory language does
not provide such a floor that states are required to adopt, the express
purposes cannot realistically be construed as representing a finding that it is
necessary to require some minimum set of criteria persons are to meet in
order to possess a firearm within a school zone.
Crucially for our purposes, nothing in the express purposes delves into
the manner by which a state implements determination of whatever
minimum criteria for possession are in fact met. So, the expressly articulated
purposes cannot fairly be said to support the ATF's interpretation of the
GFSZA.
B. Purposes Culled from the Overall Statutory Scheme
Passing beyond the codified purposes, one might hypothesize a number
of potential purposes that could support the ATF's interpretation of one
being "licensed . .. by the State." We can first reject some possible purposes
that might come to mind that the structure of the actual statutory language
does not support.
1. Potential Purposes Negated by the Holding in Tait
The statute requires governmental officials to verify the individual is
"qualified under law to receive the license."132 The federal government in
Tait argued that the statute was designed to require a background check as a
component of licensure recognized by the GFSZA.'33 In Tait, the court finds
that the language "qualified under law" refers to state law.' 34 Taking that to
be the case, requiring a background check would make no sense, as a state
need not prohibit issuance based on criteria that would be revealed by a
background check.
130 514 U.S. 549, 615-18 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting, "Congress did make findings
(though not until after Lopez was prosecuted) . . . ."). An interstate commerce nexus for the crime is
reflected in the statute as amended in 1996. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, Tit. VI, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009-369 to 3009-371 (1996).
1' See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
132 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
133 United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2000).
' Id. at 1324.
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This language, if interpreted to require some form of licensee-specific
checking, could be efficacious if it were to refer to the possession being
lawful under federal law as well. But federalism principles, discussed
below, 13 would militate against such an interpretation, commandeering state
enforcement of federal law, absent a clear statement1 36 (which is missing).
This line of analysis does not render statutory language surplusage.
Rather, it would operate to deprive recognition from licenses issued in
violation of state law, which occasionally happens.1 37
2. Potential Purposes Negated by the Statutory Language - Licensure
Required to Reflect State-Specific Factors
The federal statute does not identify state-specific factors necessary for the
licensure. 138 If it did, one might find a purpose that required the language to
be read as mandating a state make the assessment without delegation.
For example, the federal government might have concluded that different
training is required to use a firearm safely in an urban school zone as
opposed to one in a rural area. Had it done so, it might have required state-
specific training in order to possess a license authorizing firearms possession
in a school zone. And such a scheme might not be implemented effectively
where the licensee was licensed through reciprocity. But the federal statute
does not reveal such a scheme.
As suggested by the statutory language, some licensing is done within
states at the state level, whereas in other states it is done at a local level, e.g.,
by sheriffs. Where it is done at a local level, one can see an astonishing
disparity within a state in the frequency with which licenses are granted. For
example, over the period 1987 through 2007, one sees in California only a
handful of licenses issued in San Francisco (annual counts ranging between
2 to 11), compared to Kern County (annual counts ranging from 2961 to
4314)." Perhaps it is county-specific circumstances that justify the vastly
135 See infra notes 232-2345 and accompanying text.
136 See infra Part VIII.
137 See infra note 152.
138 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
139 See CCW Counts by County, http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/forms/pdf/ccwissuances2007.pdf (last
visited July 3, 2016). This cryptic document does not unambiguously state whether it identifies
outstanding licenses for a year or issuances in the year. It may well reference outstanding licenses,
because there were only three licenses outstanding in 2009 issued by San Francisco law enforcement
personnel. See Pizzo v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. C 09-4493 CW, 2012 WL 6044837, at *8-10
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012) (noting a total of three permits outstanding in 2009, one issued by San Francisco
Police Department and two by the San Francisco Sheriff's Department; one James F. Harrigan, legal
counsel to the sheriff, stated the sheriff has not issued a permit to "any private citizen," though he himself
had been issued one of the two permits, notwithstanding his being only a civilian employee of the
Sheriffs Department.). See generally Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New
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different requirements for the issuance of permits among various California
counties (or other disparities throughout other states). But for purposes of
the GFSZA, a permit issued by a state subdivision often is satisfactory
throughout the entire state.14 (
So, the GFSZA already contemplates that a state may identify different
geographic concerns that influence permitting, but those differences do not
make the licensure unsatisfactory, for purposes of the GFSZA, in locales that
operate under different regimes. There is not a reason, identified in the
GFSZA, why interstate variation would be inconsistent with the objectives
of the GFSZA where such intrastate variation exists.
The GFSZA does not require an intrusive review of an applicant's
character involving the exercise of judgment. Some state licensing regimes
can involve that.' 4 ' Insofar as that kind of review was thought desirable, it
surely would be more effective if done in a jurisdiction of residence, where
applicant-specific factors would be more readily assessed.' 42
3. Potential Purposes Negated by the Statutory Language - A Purpose
Simply to Prohibit the Practice
One might be inclined to conclude that interpretation of the GFSZA is to be
guided by a purpose simply to prohibit firearms possession in school zones.
Senator Kohl introduced the Gun-Free School Zones Act in the Senate.1 43
He recited an estimate that "more than 100,000 students carry guns to school
every day,"'" further noting:
Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 712-16 (1995) (discussing the
variation within California and its relation to the rates of various crimes).
'" E.g., Scocca v. Smith, 912 F. Supp. 2d 875, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2012). However, in California, if the
permit was issued on the basis of the licensee's place of employment (as opposed to the licensee's place
of residence), the license is only valid in the county of issuance. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26220(b) (Westlaw
through urgency legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg. Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex. Sess.,
and all propositions on 2016 ballot).
141 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 ("No license shall be issued or renewed except for an applicant
... (b) of good moral character. . . .") (Westlaw through L.2016, chs. I to 332); Velez v. DiBella, 77
A.D.3d 670, 670-71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (affirming denial of permit issuance where the licensing
officer referenced applicant's criminal history comprising one disorderly conduct conviction and five
arrests resulting in dismissal of charges or resolution in the applicant's favor; stating, "The fact that five
of the petitioner's arrests resulted in the dismissal of the charges against him or were resolved in his
favor, did not preclude the respondent from considering the underlying circumstances surrounding those
arrests in denying the application." (citations omitted)).
142 See, e.g., Osterweil v. Bartlett, 819 F. Supp. 2d 72, 85 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying intermediate
scrutiny in rejecting a Second Amendment claim, finding "The State is in a considerably better position
to monitor its residents' eligibility for firearms licenses as compared to nonresidents."), vacated, 738
F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2013). That suggests licensure through reciprocity may be superior.
143 136 Cong. Rec. 1161, 1165 (Feb. 5, 1990).
'" 136 Cong. Rec. 27,431 (Oct. 4, 1990) (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl).
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As a step in the right direction, I am pleased that this body
unanimously adopted S. 2070, my Gun-Free School Zones
Act, as part of the omnibus crime bill. The act would make
it a [fjederal crime to bring a gun within 1,000 feet of a
school or to fire a gun in that zone.145
The act as adopted by Congress contained the identical language
introduced by Senator Kohl in February concerning an exception for
licensed persons (but for one comma).14 6 Because the statutory language
contained from the time it was proposed an exception for licensed persons,
it is not amenable to being construed as having an outright ban as its purpose.
It might be amenable to construction indicating a purpose to require
someone to check that any subject's possession of a firearm was lawful
before the licensure. But, as noted above,1 47 that construction was directly
rejected by the court in United States v. Tait.148 And, in any case, the
interpretive issue that is the subject of this Article involves whether any
required checking can be delegated to the subject's state of residence. If the
purpose is to assure the checking is done, such a delegation is not
inconsistent with the purpose, unless the purpose represents malignant
suppression of exercise of firearms rights, by simply making it more
burdensome for a state to effect the licensure it wants to allow. Were there
such a malignant purpose, it should be disregarded. 149
4. Facilitating State Control oflts Inferiors
It is at least conceivable that a state might benefit from federal assistance in
assuring the state's inferior officers, or its subdivisions, do not violate state
145 136 Cong. Rec. 27,431 (Oct. 4, 1990). In February of that year, in introducing the bill, he
referenced additional exceptions (for school-approved programs, law enforcement officers, unloaded
guns in locked containers and possession on private property that is not part of school grounds), but did
not reference the licensure exception. 136 Cong. Rec. 1165 (Feb. 5, 1990).
146 See 136 Cong. Rec. 1165 (Feb. 5, 1990). The only differences between the language of the
exception as first proposed in the Senate by Senator Kohl and the currently codified version are the
addition of one comma and the correction of a typographical error. Compare 136 Cong. Rec. 1165 (Feb.
5, 1990) and Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-
45 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-327) (adding 18
U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(B)(ii), as part of the newly adopted 18 U.S.C.A. 922(q)), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 922
(q)(2)(B)(ii) (providing identical language, other than punctuation and the substitution of "obtains" for
"obtain").
141 See supra notes 112-118, 132-136 and accompanying text.
148 202 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2000).
14 Such a purpose would be in tension with interpretive notions under which federal statutes are
construed so as not to interfere with a state's discharge of its sovereign functions. See generally infra
note 161. It would turn such a purpose on its head.
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law in permit issuance.'o5 One can readily locate circumstances involving
the alleged failure to conform to the obligations imposed by the permitting
process, resulting in allegedly wrongful denial of a permit.'i The other type
of malfeasance, a wrongful issuance of a permit, is more difficult, but not
impossible, to identify.'52 One might venture that the statute is designed to
restrain faithless functionaries bent on wrongfully issuing permits to some
select set of favored persons, by substantially restricting the utility of those
permits. One supposes a legislature might conjecture that the improper
issuance of permits is more widespread than evidenced by litigated cases, by
virtue of the typical absence of standing to litigate, or an actual interest in
litigating, an allegedly improper issuance of a permit. So, the under-
identified problem might warrant a remedy.
But even were one to extract this purpose from the statutory language,
that would not support either a conclusion that the GFSZA requires some
licensee-specific action be taken or a conclusion that the GFSZA prohibits
delegation of the licensure process to a nonresident's state of residence. This
purpose would influence the manner in which delegates went about the
process of issuing permits, not what is to be checked and to whom a state
chose to delegate the performance.
"o The local licensure of firearms possession can be haphazard. See generally Cramer & Kopel,
supra note 139, at 683 (discussing the 1992 issuance of a permit to the new police chief of Los Angeles,
the first issuance of a permit after 1984 in the City of Los Angeles; the chief could not qualify to be a be
a police officer in Los Angeles, for failure of the Police Officer Standards and Training test, though he
could retain his appointed post).
' E.g., Miller v. Collier, 878 P.2d 141, 143, 145 (Colo. App. 1994) (reinstating claims alleging
police chief, in violation of state law, failed to promulgate rules concerning issuance of permits and
alleging "while defendants issue concealed weapons permits to law enforcement officers, government
employees, and private citizens who are former law enforcement officers 'on a select basis,' they have
refused since May of 1992 to issue permits to other private citizens such as plaintiffs."); Comm'r of Pub.
Safety v. Bd. of Firearms Permit Exam'rs, 21 A.3d 847 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (affirming administrative
review reversing revocation of permit); De La Cruz v. Parella, Nos. 16-167-M.P., 16-168-M.P., 16-
190-M.P., 2016 WL 6395934 (R.I. Oct. 25, 2016) (ordering police chief to enter new decisions on
applications, setting forth factual findings, stating the chief had failed to follow the court's prior holding
in Gadomski v. Tavares, 113 A.3d 387 (R.I. 2015)). See generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Judicial
Review of State or Local Administrative Order Approving, Denying, or Revoking Permit or License to
Carry, Possess, or Own Firearm, 91 A.L.R.6th 435 (2014).
152 See, e.g., Wooster, supra note 151 (providing limited illustrations). Crawford v. State, 356 So.
2d 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), holds that a permit unlawfully issued to one previously convicted of a
crime of violence was invalid and was, therefore, not a basis to invalidate a subsequent conviction of
possessing a pistol after having been convicted of committing a crime of violence. The opinion does not
clarify why the permit was issued, though it references an unanswered application question concerning
prior criminal convictions. Id. at 690. Another invalid permit issuance is discussed in Ex parte Johnson,
620 So. 2d 665, 666 (Ala. 1993).
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5. Capturing the Identities ofLicensed Persons & Facilitating Searches
One might envision that the federal government had in mind certain
procedures that would allegedly enhance the effectiveness of law
enforcement in school zones. That could include requiring that the licensure
process necessarily allow generation of a list of persons authorized to carry
firearms in a school zone. This purpose would not support a conclusion that
the GFSZA prohibits delegation of the licensure process to a nonresident's
state of residence. There would still be a list that could be checked.153 This
purpose, were it clearly adopted, would, however, militate against
recognition of authorization not involving licensee-specific acts.
Occasionally, an argument is made that it is desirable to be able to extend
the circumstances where persons can be searched for firearms possession
absent probable cause and a warrant (or exigent circumstances). For
example, one amicus brief in McDonald v. City of Chicago 5 4 unsuccessfully
sought to support a claim that "[t]he Second Amendment's right to bear arms
is not enforceable against state and local governments by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment"1 5' by arguing the opposite result would decrease
the ability to "frisk" members of the public for firearms. 15 6
1' One might quibble that the list is of less practical utility. That does not seem well-founded. If
state permits had a limited scope, so that one could easily identify a limited number of persons who had
authority to possess a firearm in a particular school zone, there might be an issue.
Let's say that a state's permits were only valid in a particular county, and there was no reciprocity.
That would allow generation of a relatively compact list of persons authorized to possess a firearm in a
particular school zone. So, were one to seek to identify the persons authorized to possess a firearm in a
particular school zone for some law enforcement purpose, that list might be rather short. And it would
be more practical to investigate the identified persons than would be the case were all permit holders
from a number of other states required to be checked.
However, state permits are not necessarily restricted to some state subdivision. See, e.g., supra note
140. So, for example, even without reciprocity, were one to seek, for law enforcement purposes, to get a
list of all persons authorized to possess firearms in a particular school zone, the list would extend to all
persons authorized by the state. So, allowing reciprocity does not necessarily give rise to a transition
between being able to check a compact list and having to check a very lengthy list. That permits can be
valid state-wide means there will be a long list in either case.
154 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
"' Brief of the United States Conference of Mayors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
2-3, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (citations omitted).
156 For example, a brief filed by the General Counsel of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and Prof.
Lawrence Rosenthal of Chapman University in McDonald v. City of Chicago argues:
Firearms regulation plays a central role in enhancing police authority to engage in
stop-and-frisk tactics. When applicable law bans the possession or carrying of
firearms, a stop and frisk conducted.by an officer who reasonably suspects that an
individual is illegally carrying a firearm - such as a suspicious bulge in a
waistband - is considered constitutionally reasonable. When applicable law
generally permits individuals to carry firearms, however, the Fourth Amendment
does not permit a stop-and-frisk even when there is reason to believe that a suspect
is armed or dangerous because there is no indication of a violation of law.
176
Federalism & Reciprocity under the GFSZA
This odious1 7 objective would nevertheless be capable of realization, at
least in some jurisdictions,"' if the GFSZA recognized licensure through
reciprocity. But it would be inconsistent with blanket authorization (not
involving licensee-specific acts).
6. Conclusion
In sum, the term "licensed . . . by the State" does not, by itself, i.e.,
without reference to anything else, unambiguously prohibit delegation of an
otherwise satisfactory licensure process to a nonresident's state of residence
- either it is ambiguous in that regard or it unambiguously allows that
delegation. The discussion in this Part VI supports the determination that
conclusion is not varied by referencing the evident purposes of the act as a
whole. And if that is the case, the federalism principles examined below 9
would require the ambiguity to be construed in favor of allowing the
delegation.
Some possible purposes might support exclusion, from licenses effective
for purposes of the GFSZA, of licensure not involving licensee-specific
action. As that broader question is not at the heart of this Article's
investigation, we shall not dally further on that issue.
VII. FEDERALISM MILITATES AGAINST THE ATF's
INTERPRETATION
A. Introduction
An interpretation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended, under
which a state cannot license through reciprocity nonresident firearm
Brief of the United States Conference of Mayors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (citations omitted).
There is authority allowing a Terry stop of an individual identified as carrying a firearm where a
license is a defense to a crime involving possession of a firearm and the officer does not know whether
the possessor is licensed. E.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., No. CIV.A
109-CV-594-TWT, 2009 WL 5033444, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2009) (citing, e.g., State v. Timberlake,
744 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. 2008)). But see, e.g., United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000)
(stating, "[N]or does a mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm, as dangerous as firearms may
be, justify an officer in stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion required by Terry. . . ."). But
where the possession is generally allowed, the fact that a person possesses a firearm does not, "by itself,
create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory detention." St. John v. McColley, 653
F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M. 2009).
.' See generally Pulley v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) ("[A] Terry
search may not be conducted to discover evidence of crime.") (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
146 (1972)).
I See supra note 156.
's See infra Part VIl.
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possession in covered areas raises a number of federalism issues. A number
of components of those federalism concerns representing different levels of
abstractions (some are subsets of another) are examined in this Part VII and
Part VIII.' 60 To be clear, this listing represents the topics explored in further
detail below; the descriptions of the topics are not summaries of the relevant
analyses or conclusions.
First, "the Constitution was . . . intended to preserve to the States the
power that even the Colonies had to establish and maintain their own
separate and independent governments, except insofar as the Constitution
itself commands otherwise." 6 ' Under Printz v. United States,'62 the federal
government is restricted in commandeering states for the implementation of
federal regulatory schemes.
Second, "How power shall be distributed by a state among its
governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state
itself."'63 That issue is presented because the ATF's interpretation of the
GFSZA impinges on the manner in which a state may engage in decision-
6" There are other potentially relevant principles. For example, one might consider whether at least
some reciprocity arrangements are compacts subject to the Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause, Art.
1, § 10, cl. 3. These reciprocity arrangements do not seem to be within the scope of compacts requiring
congressional approval under the Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause. "The application of the
Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are 'Directed to the formation of any combination tending
to the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States.' " New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976) (quoting Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)). Licensure offirearms possession by reciprocity would not seem
to tend to increase the political power of the states. Moreover, modem application of this restriction is
toothless. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEx. L. REv. 741, 766 (2010)
("In fact, no court, at any level, has ever found an interstate agreement lacking congressional approval to
encroach on federal supremacy."). See generally McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir.
1991) (finding the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children does not need congressional approval,
citing the compact's regulation of "areas ofjurisdiction historically retained by the states").
6' Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 (1970) (Black, J., announcing judgments of the Court).
See also, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162-63 (1992) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455,458 (1990)); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437,451 (1905) ("Among those matters
which are implied, though not expressed, is that the nation may not, in the exercise of its powers, prevent
a state from discharging the ordinary functions of govemment .... "), abrogated by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543 (1985); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868)
("Without the States in union there could be no such political body as the United States.... [I]n many
articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the
independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized."); see also infra notes 218-222 and
accompanying text.
This Article focuses on the application of case law to a precise context. A broader survey of the
relevant scholarship is beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent, apt, broader relevant discussion of
scholarly perspectives, see Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1087 (2016).
162 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
163 Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
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making. So, federalism principles could restrict federal dictation of the
manner of state decision-making.
Third, the extent to which those federalism principles may restrict federal
limits on the manner of state decision-making often is not resolved by
litigation. That is a consequence of the following interpretive principle: "[I]f
Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States
and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so
'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' "'6
Fourth, the validity of the ATF's position requires that the federal
government would have the authority to impose an outright ban on firearms
possession in school zones. One might question whether the federal
government does have that authority, given the scope of the possiblel65
impingement on the rights secured by the Second Amendment.
The above order seems to be the easiest way to list the relevant issues and
some of their components. However, the textual development of these issues
is most suitably presented in a different order. We shall first examine, in Part
VII.B, perhaps the most prominent issue: the extent to which the federal
government may commandeer state actors in implementing a federal
regulatory scheme.
However, as interpreted by the ATF, the GFSZA is not simple
commandeering. Rather, it leaves states with a second choice - having
private firearms possession banned in the covered areas. Part VII.C details
the principles involving such choices, which often arise in the context of
challenges to federal spending programs. As noted there, a federal regulation
is infirm where a state is relegated to a set of choices none of which the
federal government can command. Part VII.C then details the substantial
question of whether the federal government could impose the choice not
involving commandeering - whether it could ban private firearms
possession in covered areas. The questions are substantial.
Lastly, Part VIII turns to the interpretive bias, under which courts avoid
such problems by "construing" statutes so as not to raise federalism
concerns. 166 To put the issue in context, Part VIII examines a quite limited
' Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
161 "Possible" because the Supreme Court apparently has not held the Second Amendment protects
firearms possession outside the home. But see infra notes 186-193 and accompanying text.
166 A related theory might result in a court rejecting the ATF's interpretation. The ATF's
interpretation produces anomalous results. Some states do not license nonresidents; others will. Of those
that do not, some rely on reciprocity, e.g., Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030.4 (Westlaw through
emergency legislation approved through July 5, 2016) (recognizing all permits); id. § 571.101.2(1)
(limiting licenses to Missouri residents, armed forces members stationed in Missouri and spouses of such
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set of authority that suggests the intrusion into the state sphere is too great
even if there is an alternative option that the federal government could
require (banning firearms possession in the covered area). Part VIII then
details the manner in which the interpretive bias is applied, under which
courts avoid federalism concerns by what is styled as interpretation.
B. Commandeering: The Federal Government Cannot Require States to
License Firearms Possession in a Particular Manner
As the Supreme Court notes in New York v. United States,16 7 delegates to
the Constitutional Convention contemplated the possibility that a new
Constitution would exercise authority directly over states.1 68 The Court notes
the following in discussing the Constitutional Convention's rejection of that
approach: "We have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain
acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit
those acts."1 6 9
Under these principles, Congress would not have the authority to
commandeer states to engage in licensing persons entitled to possess
firearms in school zones, even if Congress could directly prohibit possession
members; not authorizing general issuance of permits to nonresidents). On the other hand, Idaho, which
recognizes all out-of-state permits, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(5)(g), will issue permits to
nonresidents. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(11) (Westlaw through the 2016 Second Regular Session of
the 63rd Idaho Legislature).
This circumstance creates a regulatory patchwork completely unrelated to any legitimate
governmental interest if the ATF's interpretation is correct. States that recognize all out-of-state permits
have, from their perspective, concluded those nonresidents licensed out-of-state are suitable to carry
concealed firearms generally throughout the state. However, for the subset of states comprising those
that do not license nonresidents, the ATF's interpretation, if correct, would result in all nonresidents
being banned from possessing firearms in covered areas. There are not heightened federal governmental
interests in banning private firearms possession in the states that license nonresidents only by reciprocity.
And the lines drawn also are unrelated to any federal governmental interest because, according to United
States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320, 1324 (1lth Cir. 2000), in adopting the GFSZA, Congress sought to defer
to whatever licensure regulations the relevant state has adopted.
These circumstances would make it very difficult to conclude that the ban is consistent with whatever
level of scrutiny would apply, see generally infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text, if the Second
Amendment extends to possession outside the home. See infra notes 186-195 and accompanying text.
Understanding the existence of a substantial constitutional question arises from the ATF's interpretation
on this basis as well, a court could similarly be inclined to avoid the ATF's construction. See generally
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress."); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949
(1997) (describing that approach as "modern avoidance").
6. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
'6 Id. at 164-65.
69 Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
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of firearms in school zones.'7 0 We are here discussing a direct requirement,
as opposed to conditioning a state's receipt of federal funds on the state
participating in that activity, which would be subject to a different
analysis. 171
Printz v. United StateS 72 presents a circumstance similar to any attempt
by the federal government to require that states participate in licensing
firearms possession in areas covered by the GFSZA. It involves a statute
requiring that for handgun sales by dealers, some local chief law
enforcement officers "make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5
business days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law,
including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are
available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General." 73
In concluding the statute is infirm, the Court notes that the Constitution
obligates the President to execute federal law.1 74 It continues:
The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to
thousands of CLEOs[, chief law enforcement officers,] in
the 50 States, who are left to implement the program
without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed
meaningful Presidential control is possible without the
power to appoint and remove). The insistence of the
Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive - to ensure
both vigor and accountability - is well known. That unity
would be shattered, and the power of the President would
be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively
17 See id. ("We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the
States to require or prohibit those acts."). Whether the federal government could prevent that possession
is discussed infra notes 197-216 and accompanying text.
171 See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (discussed infra note 183 and accompanying text).
172 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
73 Id. at 903. The statute excluded officers in states that developed an instant background check
system or that issued handgun permits after a statutorily-described background check. Id.
1 See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2180, 2181 (1998) (discussing the historical support for, and lack of
support for, the holding in Printz); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New
Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of
Presidential Oversight ofState-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1603-
04 (2012) (discussing the possibility that vesting of executive powers in states "encroach[es] on the
president's duty to superintend the implementation of federal law").
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without the President as with him, by simply requiring state
officers to execute its laws.'
The Court concludes that it does not make a difference whether the
federal statute directs the states themselves or their officers. 17 6 And it
concludes balancing of burdens on the state, compared to the benefits of the
act, is inapposite where the object of the federal statute is to direct the
functioning of state officers, as opposed to merely imposing an incidental
burden on them."
Additionally apt is comparison with Willis v. Winters,' in which local
sheriffs asserted that they need not issue concealed handgun licenses to
persons who met the requirements of state law but who, as unlawful users of
controlled substances,17 9 would violate federal law were they to possess
firearms:s0
It follows from that "anti-commandeering" principle that
Congress lacks authority to require the states to use their
gun licensing mechanisms to advance a particular federal
purpose.... The state's decision not to use its gun licensing
mechanism as a means of enforcing federal law does not
pose an obstacle to the enforcement of that law. Federal
officials can effectively enforce the federal prohibition on
gun possession by marijuana users by arresting and turning
over for prosecution those who violate it.'"'
521 U.S. at 922-23 (citations omitted). Gerken describes the commandeering principles as
follows: "The prohibition on commandeering may be fuzzy at the edges, but it's a workable rule that
corresponds to a basic intuition: Congress can't take over states' governing apparatuses and force them
to do its bidding." Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARv. L. REv. 85, 101
(2014).
"' 521 U.S. at 930 ("The Brady Act, the dissent asserts, is different from the "take title" provisions
invalidated in New York because the former is addressed to individuals - namely, CLEOs - while the
latter were directed to the State itself. That is certainly a difference, but it cannot be a constitutionally
significant one.").
". Id. at 931-32.
"' 253 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2011).
19 See id. at 1060 (referencing possession of medical marijuana pursuant to registry identification
cards issued under the state's medical marijuana act).
'i See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327) (criminalizing, inter alia,
the possession by such a person of a firearm or ammunition that has been shipped in interstate or foreign
commerce).
"' Willis, 253 P.3d at 1066 (citations omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
162 (1992)). See generally supra note 117.
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Directly commandeering state or local officials to ascertain those persons
who are entitled to possess a firearm in a school zone, by mandating the type
of background check at issue in Printz, is clearly invalidated by the analysis
in Printz. Because Printz expressly rejects balancing of the state burdens and
the federal benefits,'82 it is irrelevant whether there may be heightened needs
to assure firearms are not possessed in school zones. Printz expressly rejects
balancing for this type of direct commandeering.
C. Prohibited Alternative
1. Overview
Of course, the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended, does not effect
such a direct commandeering. It does not expressly require a state to
participate in any way in licensing private party possession of a firearm in a
covered area. Rather, it provides each state a choice: either the state chooses
to license a person, in the fashion contemplated by the statute, or that
person's possession in a covered area is prohibited under federal law. This
distinction is significant in analyzing the ATF's interpretation.
This type of choice is often encountered in cases upholding federal
regulation of interstate commerce. Where the federal government has the
authority to regulate activity in a state directly, that regulation is not rendered
infirm by providing a state with an alternative under which the state
participates in implementation of a federal scheme. The state's option to
decline to participate, and subject its citizens to lawful, direct federal
regulation, validates the arrangement.
This approach would fail to validate the ATF's interpretation, of course,
if the federal government would not have the authority to ban firearms
possession in the covered areas. This Part VII.C examines the arguments
supporting each side. Each position is at least plausible and could be asserted
in good faith.
New York v. United States articulates the basic framework for examining
federal statutory regulation of state action that presents states with the type
of choice at issue in the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended:
First, under Congress' spending power, "Congress may
attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds." Such
conditions must (among other requirements) bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal spending;
182 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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otherwise, of course, the spending power could render
academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of
federal authority. Where the recipient of federal funds is a
State, as is not unusual today, the conditions attached to the
funds by Congress may influence a State's legislative
choices. [South Dakota v.] Dole was one such case: The
Court found no constitutional flaw in a federal statute
directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold
federal highway funds from States failing to adopt
Congress' choice of a minimum drinking age. Similar
examples abound.
Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate
private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have
recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of
regulating that activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. This
arrangement, which has been termed "a program of
cooperative federalism," is replicated in numerous federal
statutory schemes. 83
83 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (citations omitted) (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
See generally Krotoszynski, supra note 174, at 1645-53 (discussing the implications of accountability
of cooperative federalism); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
567, 617 (2011) (stating, "[T]he Court has routinely upheld clearly stated funding conditions that violate
no independent constitutional bar, no matter the amount of funds involved or the tangential relationship
a funding condition may bear to the federal program of which it is part." (citing Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell
N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a
Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 464-69 (2003))).
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), seven justices
found an invalid exercise of spending authority the "threatening to withhold all of a State's Medicaid
grants, unless" the "State[] ... expand[s] ... [its] Medicaid program[] by 2014 to cover all individuals
under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line." 135 S. Ct. at 2601
(Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); see id. at 2662 (dissenting joint opinion of Scalia,
Kennedy, Alito & Thomas, JJ.) ("In this case, however, there can be no doubt. In structuring the ACA,
Congress unambiguously signaled its belief that every State would have no real choice but to go along
with the Medicaid Expansion. If the anticoercion rule does not apply in this case, then there is no such
rule."); id. at 2666. Following Dole, Justice Roberts' opinion states, "We accordingly asked whether 'the
financial inducement offered by Congress' was 'so coercive as to pass the point at which "pressure turns
into compulsion."' " Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S.
at 211). Justice Roberts, speaking for himself and Justices Breyer and Kagan, concludes, "In this case,
the financial 'inducement' Congress has chosen is much more than 'relatively mild encouragement' -
it is a gun to the head.... The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State's overall budget, in contrast,
is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid
expansion." Id. at 2604-05. The dissenting joint opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and Thomas
also concludes the act is impermissibly coercive. See id. at 2666 (dissenting joint opinion of Scalia,
Kennedy, Alito & Thomas, JJ.).
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The Court ties these principles to a notion that federal compulsion of state
regulation problematically attenuates political accountability. The Court
states, "Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling
it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences;
state officials remain accountable to the people. By contrast, where the
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both
state and federal officials is diminished." 84
In New York v. United States, the Court applies these principles to a
federal regulation that requires a state either to take title to radioactive waste
or to regulate it according to federally mandated instructions. The Court
concludes that mandating this choice, involving options neither of which the
federal government could individually command, is infirm:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to
waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of
Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing
alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it
follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a
choice between the two.1 8 5
The Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended, as it is interpreted by the
ATF, presents a choice to states. Each state can:
* ban nonresident possession of firearms in covered areas; or
* allow it to those nonresidents whom the state itself directly licenses,
without having delegated processing of the licensure to another state.
Given the scope of the area covered by the GFSZA, there is a substantial
question whether a federal ban on private firearms possession in the covered
areas would comport with the Second Amendment.
Whether the federal government could ban private firearms possession in
locations covered by the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended, is not
resolved by incontestable authority. There are two primary factors relevant
to analyzing the issue:
'" 505 U.S at 168.
"I Id. at 176. See generally Mickelsen Farms, LLC v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Servs.,
No. 1:1 5-CV-00143-EJL-CWD, 2016 WL 1048857, at *6 (D. Idaho Mar. 11, 2016) (holding a plaintiff
adequately alleges violation of the Tenth Amendment by an agency rule, see 7 C.F.R. § 301.86-2(b)
(Westlaw through June 30, 2016), that provided that assorted crops from an entire state will be
quarantined unless a Federal agency administrator determines the state "has adopted restrictions on the
intrastate movement of regulated articles that are equivalent to the interstate requirements promulgated
by [the agency].").
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(i) whether any right to bear arms secured by the Second Amendment is
limited to the home or some subset of private locations (and does not extend
to bearing arms while traveling between those locations); and
(ii) if not, whether the geographic restriction would comport with
whatever type of scrutiny a court found applicable.
2. Whether Any Right to Bear Arms Secured by the Second Amendment Is
Limited to Private Locations
Contemporary authority does not unambiguously hold that the Second
Amendment secures a right to bear arms in public. One could argue that the
language in District of Columbia v. Heller'86 compels the conclusion that it
does. In seeking a rehearing in Peruta v. County of San Diego,87 Donald
Kilmer and Alan Gura unsuccessfully so argued.' 88
Although one can make that argument, precedents in the Federal Courts
of Appeals have not consistently read District of Columbia v. Heller in that
manner. However, those courts typically have either found such a right to
bear arms in public exists 1 89 or assumed that it does,' 90 although there is
186 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
i1 Nos. 10-56971 & 11-16255, 2016 WL 3194315 (9th Cir. June 9, 2016).
18 They argued:
It is also incorrect to claim that the question of whether there is a right to carry a
handgun "was left open by the Supreme Court in Heller." As Justice Ginsburg's
definition of "bear arms" makes clear, "[a]t the time of the founding, as now, to
'bear' meant to 'carry.' " The Supreme Court repeatedly referred to "the Second
Amendment right, protecting only individuals' liberty to keep and carry arms."
This was not mere dicta. The Supreme Court expounded on the meaning of "bear
arms" because the District of Columbia and its allies argued that the term had an
exclusively militaristic idiomatic meaning that informed a collectivist purpose of
the "right." To decide the case, the Supreme Court was called upon to define the
term "bear arms," and found that "it in no way connotes participation in a
structured military organization." "In numerous instances, 'bear arms' was
unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized
militia."
Appellants' Petition for Full Court en Banc Rehearing, Richards v. Prieto at 8-9, No. 11-16255 (9th Cir.
June 23, 2016) (citations omitted), reh'g denied, Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir.
Aug. 15, 2016).
" Wrenn v. District of Columbia, No. 16-7025, 2017 WL 3138111, at *4 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2017)
("[T]he Amendment's core generally covers carrying in public for self-defense."); Moore v. Madigan,
702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) ("A right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside
the home."); cf Norman v. State, 215 So. 3d 18, 36 (Fla. 2017) (stating, "The law prohibits, in most
instances, one manner of carrying arms in public, thereby implicating the 'central component' of the
Second Amendment - the right of self-defense."), reh g denied, No. SC 15-650, 2017 WL 1365211
(Fla. Apr. 13, 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-68 (U.S. July 13, 2017); People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d
321, 327 (Ill. 2013).
" Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d426, 434 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th
Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[T]he Amendment
186
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some contrary authority.1 91 Moreover, assorted older authorityl9 2 holds that
the Second Amendment does extend to possession in public.' 93
must have some application in the very different context of the public possession of firearms. Our analysis
proceeds on this assumption." (citation omitted)); Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.
2012) ("We agree with Judge Wilkinson's cautionary holding in United States v. Masciandaro, that we
should not engage in answering the question of how Heller applies to possession of firearms outside of
the home, including as to 'what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply.' As he said, the whole matter is a
'vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree.' "
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011))). See
generally Wesson v. Town of Salisbury, 13 F. Supp. 3d 171, 178 (D. Mass. 2014) (invalidating
restriction, including on transport to training, of one having an out-of-state marijuana conviction of the
type that, had it been in-state, would not have prohibited licensure); State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165,
210 (Conn. 2014) (invalidating proscription on possession outside the home as applied to transportation
to a new home).
191 E.g., Sims v. United States, 963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C. 2008) ("Important questions about the
reach of Heller remain to be answered, but what assuredly is not 'clear' and 'obvious' from the decision
is that it dictates an understanding of the Second Amendment which would compel the District to license
a resident to carry and possess a handgun outside the confines of his home, however broadly defined.");
Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1169 (Md. 2011) ("We shall hold that Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) of the
Criminal Law Article, which prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, without a permit
and outside of one's home, is outside of the scope of the Second Amendment."); Commonwealth v.
Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 695 (Mass. 2015) (cryptically eliding the issue, where the person asserting the
right had been homeless and was living in a hotel),judgment vacated sub nom. Caetano v. Massachusetts,
136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016). See generally Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016)
(en banc) ("There may or may not be a Second Amendment right for a member of the general public to
carry a firearm openly in public. The Supreme Court has not answered that question, and we do not
answer it here.").
192 The Supreme Court addresses in Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833),
whether a different provision in the Bill of Rights is applicable to the states. The Court states, "We are
of opinion, that the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property
shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the
exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the
states." The incorporation of the Second Amendment as applicable to the states was modernly confirmed
in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). In the intervening period, i.e., after the Supreme
Court's decision in Barron, some authority nevertheless treated the Second Amendment as extending to
the states. See Nunn v. State, I Ga. 243, 250 (Ga. 1846) ("The language of the second amendment is
broad enough to embrace both Federal and State governments - nor is there anything in its terms which
restricts its meaning.").
" E.g., Nunn, I Ga. at 251; In re Brickey, 70 P. 609, 609 (Idaho 1902) (relying on both the Second
Amendment and the state constitution); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489-90 (La. 1850). See
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS
AND POLICY 253-88 (2012), for a cogent presentation of much of the relevant authority discussed in this
note. The pertinent authority often holds the manner of possession can be restricted. E.g., Nunn, 1 Ga. at
251 ("We are of the opinion, then, that so far as the act of 1837 seeks to suppress the practice of carrying
certain weapons secretly, that it is valid, inasmuch as it does not deprive the citizen of his natural right
of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to keep and bear arms."); Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489-90.
Some older authority allowed bans on the concealed carrying of a firearm where open carrying was
permitted. E.g., State v. Reid, I Ala. 612, 616-17 (1840) (upholding an act styled, "To suppress the evil
practice of carrying weapons secretly," stating, "We do not desire to be understood as maintaining, that
in regulating the manner of bearing arms, the authority of the Legislature has no other limit than its own
discretion. A statute which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or
which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would
be clearly unconstitutional."). In the Nineteenth Century, concealing a carried firearm was then viewed
with substantial suspicion. E.g., Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387, 388-89 (1858) (stating, as to a statute
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One may contextualize the interpretive issue by referencing the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Clayton Cramer concludes that racially tinged state firearms regulations
precipitated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 94 Nicholas
criminalizing the concealed carrying of a firearm, "It is a mere regulation of the manner in which certain
weapons are to be bome; a regulation, the object of which was to promote personal security, and to
advance public morals. To that end, it prohibits the bearing of certain weapons, 'in such a manner as is
calculated to exert an unhappy influence upon the moral feelings of the wearer, by making him less
regardful of the personal security of others.' " (quoting State v. Reid, I Ala. at 617)); Dunston v. State,
27 So. 333, 334 (Ala. 1900) ("One of the objects of the law is the avoidance of bad influences which the
wearing of a concealed deadly weapon may exert upon the wearer himself, and which in that way, as
well as by the weapon's obscured convenience for use, may tend to the insecurity of other persons.");
Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489-90 ("The act of the 25th of March, 1813, makes it a misdemeanor to be
'found with a concealed weapon, such as a dirk, dagger, knife, pistol, or any other deadly weapon
concealed in his bosom, coat, or any other place about him, that does not appear in full open view.' This
law became absolutely necessary to counteract a vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of
carrying concealed weapons, and to prevent bloodshed and assassinations committed upon unsuspecting
persons. It interfered with no man's right to carry arms (to use its words) "in full open view," which
places men upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and
which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their
country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations."). Cf Exparte Luening,
84 P. 445, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906) (stating, "The habit of carrying concealed weapons is one of the most
fruitful sources of crime, and, in our opinion, may be entirely prohibited by the proper authorities," and
implying the practice "is a menace to public safety, injurious to the public welfare"); In re Brickey, 70
P. at 609 (stating a particular statute "does not prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed, which is of
itself a pernicious practice").
In the contemporary construct, the open carrying of firearms is often viewed as more confrontational
than the concealed carrying of firearms. See MASSAD F. AYOOB, THE GUN DIGEST BOOK OF CONCEALED
CARRY 208 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the relative merits of open carry and concealed carry, identifying
as a factor militating against the former, "Open carry makes enemies for the pro-gun movement, instead
of friends. The vast majority of the American public does not see others that they know to be law-abiding
private citizens do so. Therefore, says this argument, they are frightened when they observe guns worn
openly by people not readily identified as those they are 'socialized' to seeing armed, such as armed
guards and police officers, and are therefore frightened when they see ordinary folks with guns on their
hips."); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1521 (2009) ("In many places, carrying
openly is likely to frighten many people, and to lead to social ostracism as well as confrontations with
the police."); James Bishop, Note, Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to Carry after Heller, 97 CORNELL
L. REv. 907, 924 (2012) (discussing the transition from open carry to concealed carry regimes).
9 Cramer writes:
The end of slavery in 1865 did not eliminate the problems of racist gun control
laws. The various Black Codes adopted after the Civil War required blacks to
obtain a license before carrying or possessing firearms or bowie knives. These
Codes are sufficiently well-known that any reasonably complete history of the
Reconstruction period mentions them. These restrictive gun laws played a part in
provoking Republican efforts to get the Fourteenth Amendment passed.
Republicans in Congress apparently believed that it would be difficult for night
riders to provoke terror in freedmen who were returning fire.
It appears that the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement to treat blacks and whites
equally before the law led to the adoption of restrictive firearms laws in the South
that were equal in the letter of the law, but unequally enforced.
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Johnson et al. note a repeating pattern in which freedmen would be forcibly
disarmed, facilitating subsequent intimidation and violence.' 9 Insofar as a
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to allow citizens to defend
themselves from those who were threatening violence motivated by racial
animus, limiting the Second Amendment rights to one's home is inconsistent
with effectuating the purpose. A restriction on the time or place of the
exercise of a right to bear arms is, of course, not comparable to such a
restriction on free speech rights. Being able to defend oneself at some time
or place cannot substitute for being unable to do so at another time or
place.'9 6 Physical injury or death arising from being defenseless at some time
or location is in no way mitigated by having been able to defend oneself at
another time or location.
3. Constitutionality of a Ban Were a State Opt-Out Absent
If we take it, then, that the Second Amendment's protection extends to
bearing arms in public, there is a substantial question whether the federal
government could lawfully prohibit private firearms possession in school
zones (as defined in the GFSZA). Although the Supreme Court expressly
declined to develop a standard for assessing compliance with the Second
Amendment,' 97 it did note that the standard is above mere rational basis
Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 20 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
The context of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment may be illuminated by reference to the
view it negates, expressed by the Supreme Court to support the conclusion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, that the converse
outcome would, inter alia, allow Black residents "to keep and carry arms wherever they went." The
opinion states:
More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded
them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution
which might compel them to receive them in that character from another State.
For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizens, . . . it would give them the full liberty ... to keep and carry arms wherever
they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the same
color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and
insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the State.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 416-17 (1856). See generally JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 193, at 277-78 (2012)
(noting the language); Cramer, supra, at 19-20 (same).
1 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 193, at 292.
196 See generally Volokh, supra note 193, at 1515 ("But self-defense has to take place wherever the
person happens to be.").
197 E.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 2010); see generally District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (merely rejecting rational basis review); id. at 634
("Justice Breyer moves on to make a broad jurisprudential point: He criticizes us for declining to establish
a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions.").
Journal ofLaw & Politics [Vol. XXXII:139
review.' 98 Federal Courts of Appeals have typically applied some form of
intermediate scrutiny,' 99 after making a preliminary determination that the
activity in question is within the scope of the Second Amendment's
protection.200
There is a strong case that whatever the level of review is, beyond mere
rational basis review, a federal prohibition on private firearms possession in
the covered areas would not meet that standard. That is because the covered
areas include vast portions of non-rural areas, preventing possession of an
arm in a state suitable for self-defense purposes,2 01 and would simply make
the possession generally impracticable in others.
The Crime Prevention Research Center has illustrated the vast scope of
the covered areas in selected locations.202 The below figure shows a location
in Chicago that was the subject of litigation.20 3 Significant portions are
covered by the prohibition.20 4 Because residential sidewalks have been held
not to be private property for purposes of this act,205 bearing arms for self-
' Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
I99 See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Gibbons, J.)
(plurality opinion); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d
865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010).
201 An unloaded firearm in a locked container would not be suitable. See infra note 207.
202 The Very Real Limits on Constitutional Carry: The Problem with Gun-Free School Zones, CRIME
PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 30, 2016), http://crimeresearch.org/2016/03/the-very-real-limits-
on-constitutional-carry/; cf Hetzner, supra note 14, at 389-90.
203 United States v. Redwood, No. 16 CR 00080, 2016 WL 4398082 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2016).
204 A conviction requires proof of possession at a place the defendant "knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
Mere proof that the school was in proximity to the defendant is insufficient to meet this element. E.g.,
United States v. Guzman-Montanez, 756 F.3d 1, 10-12 (1st Cir. 2014) (rejecting the position that mere
proximity to the school itself, 300 feet, adequately proves this element); United States v. Haywood, 363
F.3d 200, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing a 500-foot distance).
205 Redwood, 2016 WL 4398082, at *2. Cf People v. Tapia, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1153, 1164, 1166
(2005) (holding a sidewalk is not "private property," as used in California's Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1995, CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (amended 2012 and
2016), which the court describes as modeled on the federal GFSZA).
190
Federalism & Reciprocity under the GFSZA
defense while traveling between residential locations in these areas is
substantially restricted.
Figure 1. Circles are 1000' radius, each centered on a school. The circle
for the relevant school is shown with an "X " Unannotated map courtesy of
the U.S. Geological Survey. www.usgs.gov (visited Jan. 31, 2017). The
government asserted that defendant possessed a firearm in front of the
sidewalk at 942 W Garfield Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois. Government's
Surreply to Defendant's Motions to Dismiss Counts One and Two at 8,
United States v. Redwood, No. 16 CR 00080, 2016 WL 4398082 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 8, 2016).
Were an absolute prohibition applicable in these types of covered areas
throughout the United States, the scope of non-rural areas covered by the
prohibition would be vast. In other cases, access to those locations would
require Byzantine routes making travel impracticable.
Crucially, a ban that would prevent possession during travel to uncovered
areas often would effectively prevent bearing arms in those uncovered areas.
The statute does allow possession in covered areas of unloaded firearms in
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locked containers.2 06 However, a ban on possession of a loaded firearm in
transit through a covered location, while traveling to and from an uncovered
area, would frequently prevent bearing arms in the uncovered areas, because
bearing arms in the uncovered areas would be impracticable. For those
traveling by car, it would require repeatedly handling a loaded firearm
within the confines of a vehicle.
Namely, as one approached the perimeter of a covered area, one would
have to:
* un-holster one's loaded weapon;
* unload the weapon;2 07 and
* secure it in a locked container.
If traveling by car, safely doing so, when seated in a vehicle, would
require one to assure the arm was, throughout this process, never pointed at
a person.208 This excessive handling of a firearm creates unsupported safety
hazards.209
What would be involved for a person traveling by foot would vary
depending on the circumstances. No option might well be desirable. The
repeated handling of a firearm in the open might be unlawful (where the
jurisdiction required the firearm to remain concealed),210 or anxiety-
206 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iii) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
207 Handguns carried for defensive purposes are typically carried with a round chambered. E.g.,
Transcript of Deposition of Tim La France at 301-02, Mickle v. Glock, Inc., No. 02 CV 2227J(RBB),
2004 WL 5659191 (S.D. Cal.) (indicating firearms carried defensively are to be carried with a round
chambered); Expert Report and Affidavit of Steven C. Howard at 5, 7, Mantooth v. Glock., No. 2:09-
CV-1 3125-DPH-RSW, 2011 WL 7268335 (E.D. Mich.) (stating, "Glock knew, or should have known,
that if people are carrying pistols (Glock's or anyone else's) for protecting their lives, they are not going
to leave the chamber empty"; noting the manual indicates the firearm is to be kept unloaded and stating,
"With this warning, the people at Glock are attempting to relieve themselves of ALL responsibility to
the consumer by, in effect, saying: 'You have to keep the gun unloaded until just before you are ready to
fire.' With this warning, Glock has basically destroyed the usefulness of the firearm to the consumer and,
one way or another, places the consumer at risk. The consumer either risks hurting himself or others with
the unsafe design or risks being hurt by someone else because he cannot bring his own firearm into a
firing position before someone else can kill him.").
208 The customary four rules of firearms safety contemplate one is not to point a firearm at something
one is unwilling to destroy. See AYOOB, supra note 193, at 254 (summarizing Jeff Cooper's Four Rules
as, "(1) All guns are always (considered) loaded. (2) Never point the gun at anything you are not prepared
to see destroyed. (3) Never touch the trigger until the gun is on target and you are in the act of intentionally
firing. (4) Always be certain ofyour target and what is behind it.").
209 See generally Give UT Austin Gun Advocates a Chamber Round, STAR-TELEGRAM (July 13,
2016), http://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/editorials/article89463047.html (noting a University of
Texas at Austin proposed rule revision to eliminate requirement that firearm not have a chambered round,
referencing expert opinions that "[m]ost accidental discharges happen when weapons are being loaded
or unloaded").
210 It could be unlawful per se. Alternatively, the repeated public handling of a firearm could
increasingly give rise to a risk that the handling would be charged as a form of reckless misconduct. See
generally ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2904(A) (Westlaw through Second Regular Session of the Fifty-
Second Legislature (2016)) (defining disorderly conduct as including reckless handling ofa firearm with
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inducing. Private locations might or might not be available in particular
circumstances.
It seems unlikely any of this could be supported under some form of
review that is more intrusive than mere rational basis. Nevertheless, it is
entirely possible that a court would fail to grasp the significance of the issue.
By way of illustration, a conclusory and unexpectedly shoddy District Court
opinion in United States v. Redwood2" addresses the GFSZA as applied to
possession of a firearm across the street from a school, in the area depicted
in Figure 1.
The opinion involves a person whose possession would be unlawful
under any interpretation of the GFSZA. The analysis does not address the
nuance of one being licensed in some fashion or not by the state. Rather, the
analysis simply focuses on a determination that the federal government can
ban possession in the covered areas. The opinion does not identify the extent
to which the statute would prevent possession of a firearm outside the home
by persons not possessing a license that the federal government finds
conforming to the GFSZA, and actually analyze the impact that the
restriction would have on the ability to defend oneself generally. Rather, it
primarily parrots a conclusion that the restriction does not " 'meaningfully
impede' the core of the Second Amendment,"2 12 and provides an
knowledge of disturbing the peace); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Westlaw through the end of the
2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature) (criminalizing one who "displays a firearm or other deadly
weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm").
211 No. 16 CR 00080, 2016 WL 4398082 (N.D. 111. Aug. 18, 2016) (St. Eve, J.).
212 The relevant discussion is:
Section 922(q)(2)(A)'s compliance with the core rights guaranteed by the
Second Amendment further supports its constitutionality. The "core component"
of the Second Amendment, as identified in Heller, is the right to possess firearms
for self-defense, notably in the home. In Hall v. Garcia, a district court determined
that a Califomia statute modeled on § 922(q)(2)(A) did not burden the core rights
guaranteed by the Second Amendment and, consequently, was "substantially
related to the objective of creating a safe zone around schools." Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit found that a similar law, which banned firearms on county property,
including various "public, open spaces, did not 'meaningfully impede' the core of
the Second Amendment.["] Nordyke v. King.
Similarly, § 922(q)(2)(A) does not infringe upon the core component of the
Second Amendment. Notably, § 922(q)(2)(A) "does not apply to the possession
of a firearm . . . on private property not part of school grounds." 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(2)(B)(i). This exception expressly preserves the rights of individuals to
possess firearms in their homes for the purposes of self-defense. The statute also
includes various other exceptions allowing for the continued possession of a
firearm in a school zone under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(2)(B)(ii)-(vii). Taken together, these exceptions conscientiously restrict
the reach of § 922(q)(2)(A) and preserve the core component of the Second
Amendment.
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unsupported assertion that it does not infringe upon "the core component of
the Second Amendment," notwithstanding that, as noted elsewhere, 2 13 courts
presented with the issue typically find or assume that the Second
Amendment protects possession outside one's home.
And the District Court makes the inapt analogy to banning pornographic
theaters within 1000 feet of a school zone.2 14 The court fails to note the basic
difference: viewing pornography outside 1000 feet of a school can substitute
for viewing it in that area. In'contrast, being able to defend oneself in one
location does not substitute for being unable to defend oneself elsewhere.215
Note, for example, in Figure 1, that the areas covered include an
interstate. This illustrates the impracticability of reliance on the exception
for unloaded firearms in locked containers. The ban would require that
anyone without a permit who intended to carry a firearm for self-defense
while walking in areas outside school zones and, at some time during the
day, drove on this portion of the interstate, would need to engage in
excessive handling of the firearm. He or she would have to handle the arm
repeatedly, including loading and unloading, often in the confined space of
a vehicle.
Figure 1, however, only represents an initial step in identifying the
covered areas. To identify additional covered areas, after considering that
the covered schools extend from not point restrictions but at least
buildings,2 16 one can note that the street layout makes additional areas
difficult or impossible to access without entering a covered area. At a
minimum, entry to the centrally depicted area often would require a very
circuitous route.
Redwood, 2016 WL 4398082, at *5 (citation omitted) (quoting Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459 (9th
Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010)) (citing Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-
03799 RS, 2011 WL 995933 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011)).
One may contrast that approach with that taken in Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016), reh'g
denied (Sept. 15, 2016), petition for cert.filed, 2016 WL 7335854 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-768).
There, the court describes a similar geographic restriction applicable only to sex offender registrants
"living, working, or 'loitering' within 1,000 feet of a school," as "very burdensome, especially in densely
populated areas." Id. at 698, 701. The prohibition in the GFSZA, which is generally applicable to any
transit within such a location, is inherently substantially broader. The exception for private property in
the GFSZA does not undercut that conclusion, because one will need to transit non-exempt public
property to get to private property.
213 See supra notes 186-193 and accompanying text.
214 Redwood, 2016 WL 4398082, at *6 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 48 (1986)).
215 See id.; see also supra note 196.
216 Definitive authority including open spaces owned by schools as part of the area from which one
measures the 1000-foot zone has not been located. United States v. Nieves-Castano, 480 F.3d 597, 604
(1st Cir. 2007), makes ambiguous reference to the location of a fence at a school.
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VIII. INTERPRETIVE BIAS IMPLEMENTING FEDERALISM
PRINCIPLES AND INTERPRETIVE BIAS
But let us say a court were to find the federal government could ban
private possession of firearms for self-defense in the covered areas, i.e., a
court reached an alternative conclusion from that found in Part VII. There is
a remote possibility that a contemporary court would find federalism
principles invalidate a statute that allowed the possession only if the state
licensed the possession directly, i.e., without relying on reciprocity.2 17 Now
moribund authority from before the second third of the Twentieth Century
would more comfortably support that conclusion than contemporary
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, one can see at least some contemporary
vestiges of that older jurisprudence.
To illustrate the temporal shift, one can start with Texas v. White, where
the Court states, "The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an .
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."2 18 In Lane County
v. Oregon, the Court states, "Without the States in union there could be no
such political body as the United States. . . . [I]n many articles of the:
Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper
spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized."2 19
In that case, the Court concludes that federal law making federal notes legal
tender for debts does not operate to invalidate state law requiring taxes be
paid in gold and silver coin.220 That old approach was manifested in, for
example, limits on federal taxation of income paid by states221 and
217 Federalism concerns with the act were referenced by President George Bush in a signing
statement:
Most egregiously, section 1702 inappropriately overrides legitimate State firearms
laws with a new. and unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in these
provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be
imposed on the States by the Congress.
Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 3266, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6696-1 (Nov. 29, 1990)
(referencing section 1702, the section containing the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
218 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868), overruled by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476, 496
(1885).
219 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868).
220 Id. at 81. Illustrating the merging of interpretation and doctrinal determination, see infra notes
239-241 and accompanying text, that case equivocates as to whether it bases its conclusion on a matter
of construction. Id. at 81.
221 See, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1870) (holding the federal government cannot
impose an income tax on the income of a state probate judge, stating, "[T]he means and instrumentalities
employed for carrying on the operations of their governments, for preserving their existence, and
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invalidation of limitations placed on states during their admission to the
Union.222
Occasionally one still sees contemporary reference to limits on federal
intrusion into some core sphere of state activity. Perhaps the most apt recent
illustration is provided by In re Vargas.22 3 The case invalidates a federal
statute that purported to limit the manner in which a state sought to exercise
authority relinquished under federal law. A federal statute provides that
aliens not lawfully present are eligible for local public benefits "only through
the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively
provides for such eligibility." 224 Bar admission, according to the court, is one
of those public benefits. 2 5 Notwithstanding the plenary authority that the
federal government has over immigration,22 6 the court concludes that New
fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the Constitution, should be left free and
unimpaired, should not be liable to be crippled, much less defeated by the taxing power of another
government, which power acknowledges no limits but the will of the legislative body imposing the tax."),
overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939). See generally Metcalf&
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 522 (1926) ("Just what instrumentalities of either a state or the federal
government are exempt from taxation by the other cannot be stated in terms of universal application. But
this court has repeatedly held that those agencies through which either government immediately and
directly exercises its sovereign powers, are immune from the taxing power of the other. Thus the
employment of officers who are agents to administer its laws, its obligations sold to raise public funds,
its investments of public funds in the securities of private corporations, for public purposes, surety bonds
exacted by it in the exercise of its police power, are all so intimately connected with the necessary
functions of government, as to fall within the established exemption; and when the instrumentality is of
that character, the immunity extends not only to the instrumentality itself but to income derived from it,
and forbids an occupation tax imposed on its use." (citations omitted)). Metcalf& Eddy articulates the
underlying principle as follows: "But neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any
substantial manner the exercise of its powers. Hence the limitation upon the taxing power of each, so far
as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction which permits both to function with the
minimum of interference each with the other; and that limitation cannot be so varied or extended as
seriously to impair either the taxing power of the government imposing the tax or the appropriate exercise
of the functions of the government affected by it." Id. at 523-24 (citations omitted).
In something of an interesting twist on these federalism issues, Interior Airways, Inc. v. Wien Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 107, 112 (D. Alaska 1960), holds that a state may properly delegate to the
federal government regulation of purely intrastate air commerce.
222 See generally Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) ("The power to locate its own seat of
government, and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to
appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers."); Eric
Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering
the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 119, 178 (2004); Colby, supra note 161, at 1120 ("It was within
Congress's power to regulate navigable rivers, but Congress could not use that power to grant Illinois
less sovereign authority to regulate her rivers than other states have to regulate theirs.").
223 131 A.D.3d 4 (2015).
224 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
225 131 A.D.3d at 18.
226 Id. at 21-22 ("It is well settled that the federal government is possessed of broad and undoubted
plenary authority over matters involving immigration arising from its constitutional power to, inter alia,
'establish a[ ] uniform Rule of Naturalization.' Absent a constitutional conflict, a federal statute limiting
the conduct or activities of aliens, immigrants, and those who are present in the United States without
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York can act through its judiciary to approve the benefit, i.e., the federal
limit requiring the approval be by specified state enactment is
unconstitutional.22 7
Those inclined to make lists of contemporary authority 2 8 providing
content to federalism norms would surely reference Shelby County, Alabama
v. Holder.2 29 One encounters other references to limits; 23 0 the extent to which
they are contemporary is in the eye of the beholder.231
legal authorization is binding upon the states by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution." (citations omitted)).
227 Id. at 25.
228 Katyal and Schmidt endeavor to "identif[y] every majority opinion since Chief Justice Roberts
joined the Court that expressly relies, at least in part, on the avoidance canon in reaching its conclusion
about the meaning of a statute." Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The
Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARv. L. REv. 2109, 2120 & n.42 (2015) (citing nine
cases (excluding Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014)) in their 2015 article).
229 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013). There the Court invalidates Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (currently codified at 52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327)), 133 S.
Ct. at 2631, which "required States to obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to voting
- a drastic departure from basic principles of federalism." Id. at 2618. The Court states, "Outside the.
strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and
pursuing legislative objectives." Id. at 2623.
For a sample of the voluminous scholarly discourse addressing Shelby County, see, e.g., James
Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional
Right to Vote: Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 39 (2014); Colby, supra note 161;
Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2016).
230 For example:
(i) the manner in which state judges memorialize their opinions. Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 739 (1991) (stating, in discussing the scope of habeas
review, "[W]e have no power to tell state courts how they must write their
opinions.");
(ii) the circumstances resulting in state judge disqualification. Bardsley v.
Lawrence, 956 F. Supp. 570, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("We also lack jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's request to disqualify Judge Lawrence as the presiding judge in Bardsley
I.. . . Plaintiff points to no authority suggesting that we may act contrary to the
fundamental tenets of federalism by usurping Pennsylvania's authority over the
supervision and administration of its own courts."), affd, 124 F.3d 185 (3d Cir.
1997); and
(iii) the availability of interlocutory appellate review. Bush v. Paragon Prop.,
Inc., 997 P.2d 882, 887 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) ("Whether or not Congress intended
to require state courts to provide interlocutory appellate review of orders denying
arbitration when state law does not permit them to conduct that review, it is
constitutionally prohibited from imposing that requirement.").
231 Compare Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (holding application of
federal "minimum wage and the maximum hour provisions" to employees of states and state subdivisions
"will impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bodies"), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 536, 547-48 (1985), with Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 536, 547-48 (overruling National League of Cities and "reject[ing], as unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal
of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.' ").
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Authority also references an interpretive bias, which might be
conceptualized as qualitatively different from an actual limit on federal
authority. To turn to a contemporary statement, Bond v. United States
references the following "well-established" interpretive principle:
" '[I]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of
Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides'
" the "usual constitutional balance of federal and state
powers." To quote Frankfurter again, if the Federal
Government would " 'radically readjust[ ] the balance of
state and national authority, those charged with the duty of
legislating [must be] reasonably explicit' " about it.232
This approach is sometimes termed a clear statement principle23 3 or the
plain statement rule23' of statutory construction.2 35 Application of the
principle in the context of concerns that the federal government is
encroaching on some sphere of state autonomy is a subset of the wider scope
of constitutional avoidance. The principle applies to cases presenting
constitutional issues generally (not limited to those involving possible
encroachment on state authority).236 And, though there is some quibble
concerning whether the taxonomy properly includes it as constitutional
avoidance,23 7 courts avoid consideration of claims presenting issues under
the Constitution where a matter can be decided on another ground.2 38
Contemporary jurisprudence has receded from the high water mark of the
formal limits on federal authority. But this process is one of ebb and flow.
And, as one sees in other areas,239 one might claim that a particular
232 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539-40 (1947) (first and second alterations in original)).
233 E.g., Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002).
234 E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
235 A 1999 Executive Order also illustrates the bias against interpretations of federal law that
implicate federalism concerns. Exec. Order No. 13,132, Federalism, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug.
4, 1999).
236 E.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (applying the principle to a proffered statutory construction that would pose "serious
questions of. .. validity . . . under the First Amendment"). See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997) (discussing avoidance).
237 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 228, at 2115 n.21 (excluding this from the "avoidance canon"
and "constitutional avoidance," but including it in reference to "varieties" of avoidance).
238 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.").
239 E.g., K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702-03 (1939) ("A court can
construe' language into patently not meaning what the language is patently trying to say.. . . [Slince
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determination purportedly made of an ambiguous statute,240 simply on an
interpretive ground (that the language of a statute does not in fact create a
constitutional issue), is in fact grounded on some other basis.241
Bond involves a conflict between two women with amorous interests in
a man, where one woman sought to give the other an uncomfortable rash
through exposure to common, toxic chemicals.242 Scalia's concurrence
persuasively demonstrates that, under a literal interpretation, the defendant
unlawfully used a "chemical weapon" as defined in the statute.2 43
Nevertheless, the Court, relying on interpretive principles derived from
notions of federalism, concludes that the federal statute does not critiinalize
these acts.244 In reaching that conclusion, the Bond Court references, inter
alia, Jones v. United States,245 which narrowly construes a federal state
criminalizing arson. The Bond court notes that Jones similarly relies on
federalism principles in construing the federal statute as not extending to
criminalization of "paradigmatic common-law state crime[s]."246
they purport to construe, and do not really construe, nor are intended to, but are instead tools of intentional
and creative misconstruction, they seriously embarrass later efforts at true construction, later efforts to
get at the true meaning of those wholly legitimate contracts and clauses which call for their meaning to
be got at instead of avoided. The net effect is unnecessary confusion and unpredictability, together with
inadequate remedy, and evil persisting that calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable tools.").
240 Whether language is ambiguous is not measured solely by the literal terms. "A statute can be
ambiguous if giving it a literal interpretation would lead to an unreasonable, unjust or absurd
consequence. This is based on 'the presumption that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable, absurd
or unworkable result.' Therefore, the court is not compelled to give a strict literal meaning to the statute
when it would depart from the statute's true intent and purpose." Brady v. White, No. CIV.A.04C-09-
262FSS, 2006 WL 2790914, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2006) (footnotes omitted).
Some authority expressly indicates reference can be made to matters extrinsic to the statutory
language itself in order to determine that the language is ambiguous. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305,
325 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005), in the context
of application of the interpretive principle where federalism issues are raised and stating, "Therefore, we
will apply the clear statement rule when a statute admits of an interpretation that would alter the federal
balance but there is reason to believe, either from the text of the statute, the context of its enactment, or
its legislative history, that Congress may not have intended such an alteration of the federal balance.").
241 See generally Gerken, supra note 175, at 89-90 ("The Court could only see what it believed,
and it couldn't bring itself to believe that Congress had, in fact, passed a statute broad enough to reach
Bond's conduct. That's why the Court thought the statute was ambiguous. Because it had to be."); Katyal
& Schmidt, supra note 228, at 2112 ("[T]he so-called 'avoidance' canon now camouflages acts ofjudicial
aggression in both the constitutional and statutory spheres. .. . First, the Court has used avoidance cases
to announce new rules of constitutional law and major departures from settled doctrine. . . . Second, the
Court seems indifferent to whether the resulting statutory interpretations are at all plausible.").
242 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
243 Id. at 2094-95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
244 Id. at 2083.
24 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
246 134 S. Ct. at 2089-90 (noting, "[T]he Government's proposed broad reading would
'"significantly change[ ] the federal-state balance," mak[ing] virtually every arson in the country a
federal offense' "; and stating, "[W]e can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely
local crimes, before interpreting the statute's expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police
Journal ofLaw & Politics
In reaching this conclusion, the Court indicates that circumstances such
as the punishment of local criminal activity - circumstances of the type
implicated by ATF's interpretation of the GFSZA - are "perhaps the
clearest example" of circumstances where this interpretive presumption
should apply.247
So, there may be a less-than-gossamer distinction between merely
interpreting a federal statute so as to avoid it encroaching on state authority
in a fashion that is potentially infirm as a constitutional matter, and reaching
a substantive determination that there is a constitutional violation. The best
that can be said in support of the ATF's interpretation of the GFSZA is that
the statute is ambiguous. In any case, the ambiguity of the GFSZA is well
above the threshold level for application of the clear statement principle.
Continuing the analysis of the ATF's interpretation of the GFSZA requires
only that we examine contemporary authority supporting application of the
interpretive principle of avoidance to ambiguous statutes. So, we shall
restrict our discussion to that authority, leaving to other sources collection
and synthesis of the federalism concerns applicable in a wider context.248
Abundant authority compels the conclusion that if the GFSZA is
ambiguous concerning whether it fails to recognize state licensure through
reciprocity, these federalism principles will require the act to be construed
as recogmizing licensure through reciprocity. Perhaps most on-point,
authority holds that these federalism principles are raised by a federal statute
that restricts a state's choices concerning how it delegates its governing
authority to others, whether subdivisions2 4 9 or third parties.25O (They are also
presented in federal regulation of the qualifications for senior state
positions.25 1) And authority holds that they are raised by federal law
imposing regulation of areas that are typically regulated by the states. 2 52
Because the GFSZA as interpreted by the ATF trenches on the manner in
power of the States." (quoting Jones, 529 U.S. at 858 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349
(1971)))).
247 Id. at 2089. See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 922 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Private gun regulation is the quintessential exercise of a State's 'police power' .... ).
248 See generally, e.g., Colby, supra note 161; Jackson, supra note 174, at 2181; Katyal & Schmidt,
supra note 228, at 2111-12 (examining the avoidance canon in the Roberts Court and asserting, "Though
it originated as a 'cardinal principle' of judicial self-restraint, the so-called 'avoidance' canon now
camouflages acts of judicial aggression in both the constitutional and statutory spheres." (footnote
omitted)); Krotoszynski, supra note 174.
249 See infra notes 254-269 and accompanying text.
250 See infra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
251 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460-61,473 (1991) (holding a federal statute prohibiting
a mandatory retirement age is not sufficiently clear to impinge upon state sovereignty by invalidating a
judicial retirement age mandated by a state's constitution).
252 See infra notes 280-283 and accompanying text.
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which a state determines to delegate authority and on state regulation in an
area typically regulated by the states - the federal government does not
generally affirmatively license firearms possession - multiple prongs of the
authority combine to reject the ATF's position.
These interpretive principles are applied to a broad range of interpretive
issues: (i) the interpretation of individual words and phrases; (ii) parsing
language and attributing reference to modifiers; and (iii) filling-in details of
federal regulatory schemes not limited to parsing specific language. And
they have been used to overcome some customary canons of construction.
A. Relevant Contexts Presenting the Interpretive Principle
"How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental
organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself."253 One
thus encounters a number of circumstances in which the clear statement
principle is applied to federal regulation that would restrict the manner in
which a state chooses to delegate its regulatory authority.
For example, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier254 addresses a
federal regulation of pesticides that expressly declines to preempt regulation
by a "State."2 55 The Court holds that, notwithstanding a statutory definition
of "State" as "a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, and American Samoa,"256 the exclusion for a "State" is to be
considered as extending to regulation by a subdivision of a state.257
In sum, notwithstanding an express statutory definition, this statutory
reference to "State" means "State or a State subdivision." In reaching this
conclusion, the Court quotes from prior authority, Sailors v. Board of
Education of Kent,258 that provides a full-throated federalism justification
for allowing states to delegate authority to inferior units.25 9
253 Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
254 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
255 Id. at 606.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 616.
258 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
259 501 U.S. at 607-08 (quoting in part the language reproduced infra text accompanying note 279).
The Mortier court also references deference on the basis that the action being regulated is typically within
the state sphere. Id. at 605 ("When considering pre-emption, 'we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.' " (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
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A similar conclusion is reached in City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &
Wrecker Service, Inc.,260 construing a federal statute that excluded from
preemption safety regulatory authority of "a State." 261' The Court there holds
that safety regulation by a municipality also is not preempted, i.e., reference
to "a State" includes a state subdivision.2 62 Moreover, it does so relying on
"the basic tenets of our federal system pivotal in Mortier,"263 even though
the statutory scheme elsewhere makes express reference to "a State [or]
political subdivision of a State." 2 ' That is, the Court rejects application of
the interpretive presumption2 65 that a variation of language in a statutory
scheme is intended to connote a variation in meaning.2 66
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League2 67 involves a somewhat convoluted
issue of potential infringement on the manner in which a state chooses to
delegate authority to a subdivision. The Court frames the issue as follows:
Section 101(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
authorizes preemption of state and local laws and
regulations expressly or effectively "prohibiting the ability
of any entity" to provide telecommunications services. The
question is whether the class of entities includes the State's
own subdivisions, so as to affect the power of States and
localities to restrict their own (or their political inferiors')
delivery of such services. We hold it does not.268
There, the Court references a "working assumption that federal
legislation threatening to trench on the States' arrangements for conducting
their own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in
260 536 U.S. 424 (2002).
261 Id. at 428.
262 Id. at 428-29.
263 Id. at 434.
264 Id. at 428.
265 See id. at 433-34.
2" Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (quoting
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). See generally infra notes 297-300
and accompanying text.
267 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
268 Id. at 128-29 (citation omitted). One might endeavor to recast the federalism issue as whether a
state cannot delegate general authority to a municipality without also granting the municipality authority
to decide to provide telecommunications services - a grant of general local authority has to include a
grant of authority to provide telecommunications services.
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a way that preserves a State's chosen disposition of its own power, in the
absence of the plain statement Gregory [v. Ashcroft] requires."269
Lastly, turning to state authority, Edwards v. State270 involves application
of this interpretive principle to address whether a federal statute specified
means, other than those provided by state law, by which a state could elect
to participate in federal funding. South Carolina Governor Sanford evidently
disagreed with the contemplated use of funds.2 7 ' The Governor vetoed a
budget including use of those federal funds - a veto that was subsequently
overridden.2 72 The Governor thereafter refused formally to apply for the
federal funds.273
The Governor's position was that federal law "grants him the sole
discretion to determine whether to apply for the [federal] funds."2 74 The
South Carolina Supreme Court relies on the clear statement principle to hold
that the federal statute did not alter the extant allocation of responsibility of
branches of government under state law - did not vest that discretion in the
Governor.2 75
One inclined to quibble as to the applicability of this authority to
interpretation of the GFSZA might note that the interference with delegation
found to raise federalism issues there involves delegation to political
subdivisions or branches of the delegating state.276 Of course, the GFSZA
269 Id. at 140 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
270 678 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. 2009).
271 Id. at 415-16.
272 Id. at 416.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 418.
275 Id. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Speech on the Structural Constitution and the Stimulus
Program, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 395, 396 (2010) ("It may be that the federal government could overrule
the state constitution as it applies to the internal distribution of powers within the state by allowing the
state's governor to decide whether or not to make the appropriate applications for federal funds. But it
would be most unwise to read that aggressive intention into federal legislation when there is any
ambiguity in the language of the statutory command." (discussing Edwards)); Metzger, supra note 183,
at 593-94 (2011) (contrasting the outcome in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004),
with that in Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 257-58 (1985)
(invalidating a state statute imposing restrictions on use of funds received by local governmental units
from the federal government inconsistent with the federal authorization), and stating, "Yet instances of
the federal government authorizing localities or other state-created entities to act in ways that violate
state law are more infrequent and more fraught from a federalism perspective, raising concerns of federal
commandeering of state institutions and undermining the integrity and sovereignty of state governments.
Although the Court has recently signaled that such federal authorization of local violations of state law
may raise federalism concerns, in the past it has sustained federal power to preempt state-law limits on
actions by localities." (footnote omitted)).
276 The above recitation of authority does not purport to be comprehensive. For example, City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. states that although "[c]ities are not themselves sovereign,"
435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978) (plurality opinion), the same principles urging against construction of a statute
to infringe on the sovereignty of a state will be applicable to restrictions on the acts of state subdivisions
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interpretation would inhibit delegation to another state (or the other state's
subdivisions). One can summarily reject that quibble, both by reference to
basic principles and by reference to other authority. Let us do so in that order.
1. Reference to Basic Principles
The plain statement rule is not a freestanding legal principle. Rather, it is
part of a mosaic that collectively creates federalism and that emerges from
the existence and functioning of states contemplated by the Constitution.27 7
We have a premise that states will be able to discharge their necessary roles
effectively. The premise is not merely that states can discharge their
necessary roles to the extent that can be done directly or by delegation to
subdivisions. If performance of a traditional state function involves the
operation of persons other than that state and its subdivisions, federalism
principles contemplate that activity involving third parties also not be
inhibited.
The underlying rationale, identified by the Court in Sailors v. Board of
Education ofKent,27 8 is in accord with the view that these principles are not
inherently limited to delegations to political subdivisions of the delegator.
In Sailors, the Court states, in referencing political subdivisions:
[T]hese governmental units are "created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of
the state, as may be entrusted to them," and the "number,
nature and duration of the powers conferred upon (them) *
* * and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests
in the absolute discretion of the state."279
The inconvenience may arise from the inability to make a delegation to a
suitable delegate; it is not limited to circumstances where the delegate is a
political subdivision.
We can confirm that by noting that the interpretive principle applies to a
variety of contexts not focusing on a delegation of state authority. For
example, the interpretive principle has been applied by the Supreme Court
"pursuant to state policy." Id. at 413. According to the Court, principles of federalism dictate that state
antitrust immunity extend to municipalities where the municipalities act "pursuant to state policy" that is
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed." Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,
50-51 (1982) (quoting and analyzing City ofLafayette).
277 See generally supra note 232 and accompanying text.
278 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
279 Id. at 108 (quoting Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907)).
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in determining whether a lender's foreclosure sale280 resulted in receipt of
"reasonably equivalent value," as used in federal debtor/creditor law. In light
of a perceived "profound" impact on an "essential" state interest in security
of real estate titles that would arise from not treating amounts received by a
private lender in a foreclosure sale as "reasonably equivalent value," the
Court, relying on the underlying federalism principles, 28 1 holds those
amounts are "reasonably equivalent value." 28 2 There, applying the principle
is about private party conduct; it is not about a delegation, and it is not about
a delegation to a municipality. There are other illustrations.283
2. Other Authority
This assessment is confirmed afortiori by noting that the Supreme Court
itself in 2016 applied this federalism principle to support a conclusion that
federal law did not burden delegation of a state function to third parties (in
that case, outside counsel). 284 The Court did so without any quibble arising
280 See BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'd
sub nom. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
281 BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) ("Federal statutes impinging upon
important state interests 'cannot . .. be construed without regard to the implications of our dual system
of government. . . . [W]hen the Federal Government takes over . .. local radiations in the vast network
of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and national
authority, those charged with the duty of legislating [must be] reasonably explicit.' " (quoting
Frankfurter, supra note 232, at 539-40)).
282 BFP, 511 U.S. at 545 (1994) ("We deem ... that a "reasonably equivalent value[]" for foreclosed
property[] is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the State's
foreclosure law have been complied with.").
283 E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (addressing federal regulation
of warehouses); Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 840 F.3d 618, 620, 623-26 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding a trustee
foreclosing on a California deed of trust is not a "debt collector" as used in federal law, relying on, inter
alia, BFP, Rice, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), and Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League,
541 U.S. 125 (2004)); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 325-26 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the principle to
the "sensitive topic" of federal restriction on voting rights of criminals; holding New York's prisoner
disenfranchisement statute, N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106 (Westlaw through L.2016, chs. I to 64), is not
within the scope of activity proscribed by the Federal Voting Rights Act (currently codified at 52
U.S.C.A. § 10301 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973)).
2 The relevant federalism discussion in Sheriffv. Gillie, 136 S. Ct. 1594, 1602 (2016) (citation
omitted) (quoting Order Denying Rehearing En Bane, Gillie v. Law Office of Erica A. Jones, No. 14-
3836 (6th Cir. July 14, 2015) and Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004)), a case that
raises whether outside counsel appointed by Ohio's Attorney General were state officers exempt from a
federal statute regulating debt collection and whether alleged acts were violations, is as follows:
We further note a federalism concern. "Ohio's enforcement of its civil code - by
collecting money owed to it - [is] a core sovereign function." Ohio's Attorney
General has chosen to appoint special counsel to assist him in fulfilling his
obligation to collect the State's debts, and he has instructed his appointees to use
his letterhead when acting on his behalf. There is no cause, in this case, to construe
federal law in a manner that interferes with "States' arrangements for conducting
their own governments."
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from the delegation being to someone other than a political subdivision of
the delegator.2 85
B. Language to Which the Principle Applies; Influencing the Determination
as to Ambiguity
Understanding the scope of the application of the clear statement
principle benefits from a survey of the different types of constructs to which
it has been applied. As one might expect, the approach has been applied to
construe phrases that are inherently vague, e.g., "reasonably equivalent
value"2 86 and "navigable waters."287 It also has been referenced to exclude
from an inherently vague term, "financial institution," a rather unnatural
reading sought to be ascribed by a federal agency (inclusion of lawyers).2 88
But the interpretive principle has more force. It has been applied so as to
take individual words at other than their natural, literal meaning. As noted
above, in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier and City of Columbus v.
Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., the term "State" is construed to mean
"State or State subdivision."289 In Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League,290
the word "any," in the phrase "any entity," is construed so as not to refer to
"any" entity but only "some" entities. 2 9' That the Nixon Court rejects a
natural reading is evidenced by a number of subsequent cases rejecting
Nixon's construction of "any" in other contexts.292
That conclusion was perhaps previewed by American Bar Assn v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir.
2005). There, the court rejects the argument that these principles requiring a clear statement should not
apply to alleged federalism implications arising from construction of a federal statute insofar as it
regulates the conduct of private parties. Id. at 472. The court declines to hold a federal statute authorizes
the federal regulation of the practice of law. Id. at 467-68, 472-73. The court, in doing so, rejects the
following FTC claim that Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), should be distinguished: "According
to the Commission, the present regulation, 'by contrast . . . regulates the conduct of private entities or
individuals; there is no regulation of States or state officials.' " 430 F.3d at 472. The court continues,
"This response does not pass muster." Id. at 472.
285 See supra note 284.
286 BFP, 511 U.S. at 542-44.
287 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163, 165,
174 (2001) (noting land use is "a function traditionally performed by local governments" and, to avoid
adjusting the federal-state balance, holding "an abandoned sand and gravel pit" that is "used as habitat
by migratory bird [sic] which cross state lines" is not "waters of the United States").
288 Am. Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d at 465-67 (does not include the practice of law).
289 See supra notes 254-257, 260-266 and accompanying text.
290 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
291 See id. at 132 (stating, "Nor is coverage of public entities reliably signaled by speaking of 'any'
entity; 'any' can and does mean different things depending upon the setting."); see also supra notes 267-
269 and accompanying text.
292 E.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170 (2012) (distinguishing
the interpretive approach for "any" in Nixon); New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(same); Firearms Imp./Exp. Roundtable Trade Grp. v. Jones, 854 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 n.19 (D.D.C. 2012)
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Lastly, the principle has been applied to reject ordinary canons of
construction. It has been applied to reject application of the cardinal
principle293 that would avoid a construction resulting in some language being
surplusage. Edwards v. State29 4 construes the following sentence concerning
application for federal funds: "The Governor of a State desiring to receive
an allocation under section 14001 shall submit an application at such time,
in such manner, and containing such information as the Secretary may
reasonably require." 29 5 It interprets the sentence so as to allow a state to
make a submission even if the Governor does not, 296 which makes
surplusage the first three words ("[t]he Governor of').
The court in City of Columbus v. Ours .Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.,297
applies the interpretive principle in contravention of what is called the
"Russello presumption."298 Under that presumption, " '[W]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' "299 City
of Columbus interprets a statutory exception granted to "the safety
regulatory authority of a State" as extending to municipalities, even though
the statute elsewhere makes reference to "provisions by 'a State [or] political
subdivision of a State . . . related to a price, route, or service of any motor
carrier .. . with respect to the transportation of property,' " i.e., elsewhere
makes express, separate reference to subdivisions following a reference to a
state. 300
(same), affd sub nom. Firearms Imp./Exp. Roundtable Trade Grp. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms & Explosives, 498 F. App'x 50 (D.C. Cir. 2013); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 569 F. Supp.
2d 440, 444 (D.N.J. 2008) (same). But see Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388, 394 (2005) (citing
Nixon and holding "any court" excludes foreign courts).
293 See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
294 678 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. 2009).
295 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14005, 123 Stat. 115,
282-83 (2009) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 10005 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327)).
296 The court states, "We accordingly construe the participial phrase 'desiring to receive an
allocation [or seeking a grant]' in § 14005 as modifying the word immediately preceding it 'State' - to
avoid any conflict between our State constitutional allocation of power and the ARRA." 678 S.E.2d at
419.
297 536 U.S. 424 (2002).
298 Id. at 434-35 (using the term "Russello presumption" and discussing Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16 (1983)); id. at 444 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Russello and identifying additional textual
provisions supporting application of the presumption).
299 Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
1972)).
* 536 U.S. at 428.
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C. Summary of the Import of Constitutional Avoidance
Part III provides a number of illustrations where the phrase "licensed by,"
preceding the reference to some instrumentality, is used in the law in a
fashion that contemplates licensure without any licensee-specific action by
the licensing body. Thus, the relevant language of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, as amended, does not unambiguously prohibit delegation of any
decision-making. It is at least ambiguous in this regard, and one might argue
it in fact is unambiguous in not prohibiting licensure through delegation.
Understanding that is the case, a wealth of authority compels the
conclusion that the ATF's position is incorrect. The ATF's interpretation
would result in the federal government mandating how a state determines to
allocate decision-making authority. Federalism concerns, arising from
intrusion into a state's choice to allocate authority, have been identified in
authority that involves, inter alia:
(i) whether a federal statute that prohibits state restrictions on the
provision telecommunication services by "any entity" extends to state
prohibitions on municipalities, holding that the federalism implications
result in the federal statute not extending to state regulation of
municipalities;"o' and
(ii) whether a federal statute inhibits a state's delegation of legal work to
outside counsel.30 2
Moreover, the ATF's interpretation would alter that normal balance of
authority and would do so in a context not generally regulated by the federal
government - the permitting of persons to possess firearms. Authority
demonstrates that circumstance also heightens federalism concerns.
And lastly, the ATF's interpretation necessarily involves a "sensitive"
decision.303 It would result in criminalizing exercise of what is, under some
state constitutions, an enumerated right,3 " which exercise some states,
through delegated authority, sought to have be lawful. And it would involve
restricting private conduct that would be "sensitive" as the exercise of an
enumerated right under the Federal Constitution if that provision is not
limited to private possession in one's home.
The language of the GFSZA simply is not remotely close to
"unmistakably clear," as required under, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft,"' to
301 See supra notes 267-269 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
303 See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussed supra note 283).
3 E.g., LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 ("The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental
and shall not be infringed. Any restriction on this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny."); MO. CONST.
art. 1, § 23.
305 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
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prohibit recognition of firearms licenses through reciprocity. For all these
reasons, the clear statement principle applies to the relevant portion of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended. The ATF's interpretation, which
is inconsistent with that principle, is not correct.
CONCLUSION
The ATF asserts the Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibits a state's
licensure of private firearms possession within 1000 feet of a school through
reciprocity. The ATF asserts this conclusion is compelled by a literal
interpretation of the language.
The ATF's proffered interpretation of the term "licensed . .. by the State"
in the Gun-Free School Zones Act relies on an assumption that the term
"licensed by," when followed by "the state" or reference to some other
governmental unit, requires some licensee-specific affirmative act of the
state or governmental unit. However, the use of the term "licensed by the
state," and correlative terms, is not so restricted. Giving evident effect to
similar statutory language in a number of contexts requires that one
authorized by a governmental entity simply by statute making it so for
numerous people is sufficient for one to be "licensed by" the entity.
One can put that analysis in context byreferencing the holding in King v.
Burwell.306 There, the Court holds the term "established by the State" is not
limited to items that are established by a state.307 In light of the outcome in
Burwell, the hyper-literalism reflected in the ATF's interpretation of the
GFSZA can be rejected afortiori.
As an interpretation of a criminal statute, the ATF's interpretation is not
entitled to deference. Understanding the ATF's interpretation is not
compelled by a literal reading of the statute, one would turn to the statute's
purposes to ascertain the statute's application to licensure through
reciprocity. The purposes, expressly articulated in the statute,30 8 do not
reveal any objective furthered by burdening a state's licensure processes by
prohibiting licensure through reciprocity.
Nor do those purposes reveal any desire for consistency within a state.
Permits issued by local officials, under standards applied very differently
among localities, can authorize possession in covered areas statewide.309
" 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
307 Id. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
30s See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
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The federal government could not commandeer states in the licensure of
firearms possession in school zones. However, the GFSZA is not simple
commandeering of the manner in which states license firearms possession in
covered areas. Rather, it leaves states with a second choice - having private
firearms possession banned in the covered areas.
A federal regulation is infirm where a state is relegated to a set of choices,
none of which the federal government can command. There is a substantial
question whether the federal government could impose the choice not
involving commandeering - whether it could ban private firearms
possession for self-defense in covered areas. And mandating that a state not
effect any licensure of a nonresident through reliance on his or her state of
residence is a peculiar intrusion into the manner by which a state delegates
its authority. A wealth of authority identifies a bias in interpreting statutes
in such cases, under which courts avoid these problems by construing
statutes so as not to raise federalism concerns. The principle has been applied
to support an unnatural interpretation of language that is oft-distinguished in
subsequent authority.3 10 And the principle has been applied as part of
rejecting application of common canons of construction.3 11 In light of these
interpretive principles, the ATF's interpretation of the GFSZA, to the effect
that licensure through reciprocity does not authorize possession in covered
areas, is unsound.
310 See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 293-300 and accompanying text (discussing the cardinal principle concerning
surplusage and the Russello presumption concerning internal variation in language).
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